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-Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia, 77 AD 
A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s  
 
 Though only one name can appear on the author’s line, there are many people whose 
support and help made this thesis possible and without whom, I would be nowhere. First, I must 
thank my family. As a child, my mother and father would try to stump me with a difficult math 
and geography question before tucking me into bed each night (and a few times they 
succeeded!). Thank you for giving birth to my fascination in all things international. Without 
you, none of this would have been possible. Second, I must thank a set of distinguished 
professors. Professor Mika LaVaque-Manty, thank you for giving me a chance to prove myself, 
even though I was a sophomore and studying abroad did not fit with the traditional path of thesis 
writers; thank you again for encouraging us all to think outside the box. My adviser, Professor 
Jenna Bednar, thank you for your enthusiastic interest in my thesis and having the vision to see 
what needed to be accentuated to pull a strong thesis out from the weeds. Professor Andrei 
Markovits, thank you for your commitment to your students’ work; I still believe in those words 
of the Moroccan scholar and will always appreciate your frank advice. Professor Jana von Stein, 
thank you for taking the time to read my thesis and take part in my defense. Professor Rob 
Franzese, thank you for your early support of my research and the direction with which you 
provided me. 
 Many thanks to those professionals, current and former, at the United Nations who 
helped me gain insight into the Organization, its inner workings and the countries that they so 
proudly represent. Thank you to Johannes de Millo Terrazzanni at the Monégasque Permanent 
Mission, Andreu Jordi Tomàs at the Andorra Permanent Mission, Georg Sparber and René 
Holbach at the Liechtenstein Permanent Mission. Thank you as well to Ambassador Melvyn 
Levitsky, now a professor at the Ford School for Public Policy at the University of Michigan. 
To my students, who decided to take a risk and sign up for a course entitled Little 
Countries, Big World. You all helped me so much to further clarify my opinions, arguments and 
statements of fact. Your interest in the microstates inspires me and fills me with hope that one 
day more people will follow my path and take up serious research on these so interesting 
countries. 
To all my friends who put up with me talking endlessly about my thesis and never shut 
me up, thank you. To Sam Burns who was helpful throughout the writing process of my thesis 
and was instrumental in helping me towards my final breakthrough. 
Last, but never least, thank you to my extremely gifted classmates whose excellent work 
and insightful questions always challenged me and made me want to improve my own work. 
Through our classroom sessions and outside encounters, you were there in moments of growth, 
commiseration and creativity. I wish you all the best of luck on the completion of your diverse 
and interesting theses and defenses and the best of luck in your promising future endeavors. 
 
Clearly, I could not have written this thesis all by myself and I am deeply grateful to all 
those who helped me along the way. 
 
    Stephen Snyder 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
March 26, 2010 
Tab l e  o f  Con t e n t s  
P r e f a c e  5
A b s t r a c t  6
I n t r o d u c t i o n  7
C h a p t e r  O n e :  I m p o r t a n t  A s p e c t s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  S y s t e m  1 4
C h a p t e r  T w o :  T h e  M i c r o s t a t e s  2 5
… T a b l e  I  2 8
C h a p t e r  T h r e e :  E x a m i n i n g  P r e v i o u s  E x p l a n a t i o n s  4 8
C h a p t e r  F o u r :  1 9 4 6 - 1 9 6 0 :  T h e  C o l d  S h o u l d e r  o f  t h e  C o l d  W a r  7 5
C h a p t e r  F i v e :  1 9 6 0 - 1 9 8 9 :  T h e  D e c o l o n i z a t i o n  D o u b l e  S t a n d a r d  9 1
C o n c l u s i o n  1 0 1
B i b l i o g r a p h y  1 0 7
 
 
SNYDER | 5 
Preface 
 The following thesis is the result of two and a half years of research and a lifetime of 
interest. Since receiving a children’s encyclopedia at age 6 as a present from my grandmother, I 
have always been fascinated by the countries of the world. Four entries for which the 
encyclopedia provided scant information were those of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San 
Marino. Their absence provoked curiosity, fascination and an urge to learn more about these 
countries and their truly unique natures. Eventually, this curiosity would prompt my first 
research proposal with which I gained entry into the Political Science Honors program at the 
University of Michigan in October 2007. I could never have then imagined the complexity which 
would be necessary to answer even the simplest questions on the European microstates. 
 While these states have often been relegated to trivia and crossword puzzles, they are 
case studies of entities resting upon the threshold of sovereignty. Those brave legal scholars who 
have previously approached the European microstates have no doubt been intrigued by their 
unique situations that allow otherwise theoretical situations to manifest themselves as real.  
 Just as the microstates are unique situations so too is that of the speck of international 
land that overlooks the East River, the United Nations, its headquarters only one twenty-seventh 
the size of Monaco, the smallest of the microstates. At this point, representatives from 192 
countries converge and make decisions that affect the entire world. In order to make these 
decisions the most effectively and to the best of the members’ liking, barriers to admission exist, 
some technical, others political. Even when one entity suffices to clear certain hurdles, others 
may prevent it from eventual membership. 
 It was exciting for me as a student to find that the study of microstates is beyond 
encyclopedic but that journal articles and books have been devoted to it. Studying them is much 
more than learning arcane facts to impress people with at cocktail parties, but really an exercise 
in nuance and all that is possible in international law. I never expected that my investigation of 
the microstates would entail far-reaching concepts like the neutrality of Finland or swing of Latin 
American countries from West to South. I found it an amazing and rewarding journey and hope 
that you too will find its final report amazing and rewarding. 
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Abstract 
The European microstates of Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein and San Marino long 
desired membership in international organizations but were consistently denied. Following their 
original attempt at joining the League of Nations in 1920, the microstates were left out of top-
level international politics for seven decades until 1990 through 1993 when they were admitted 
with no opposition whatsoever. This thesis argues that they were excluded for political reasons 
and not due to their limited sovereignties, small size, incapacity to fulfill Charter obligations or 
lack of willingness as others have previously assumed. 
To prove this point, I look at the voting patterns of the General Assembly and how the 
microstates would have voted were they members. From the years 1945 to 1960, I argue that 
they would have acted as centrists between the polarized Soviet Union and United States with 
their voting blocs. I use a conceptual argument to show why no members would desire admitting 
more states that they perceived would act as centrists. Other states that shared this foreign policy, 
like Austria and Finland, were able to overcome this opposition due to persistence and deep 
diplomatic resources which the microstates lacked. Another group of centrist states were allowed 
to enter because of an ambiguity over which way they would vote and either pole believing they 
would have these new members’ support. From the years 1960 to 1989, I argue that the 
microstates would have voted along with Northern states against Southern states when the key 
polarizing issue was decolonization. As the South, organized by the Non-Aligned Movement 
took control of the General Assembly through increased membership, it discriminated against the 
European microstates by providing membership to states with less sovereignty, smaller size and 
diminished capacity who were perceived to politically agree with it on its importance issues. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Despite common misperceptions, the European microstates were feared as potentially 
disruptive actors in the United Nations whose moderate decision-making threatened to increase 
the cost of winning resolutions between East and West and whose Northern sympathies tip the 
scales between North and South. Many people are quick to dismiss Andorra, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco and San Marino (from now on, collectively referred to as the European microstates) and 
oversimplify their role in international politics. Prior to the beginning of the 1990’s, these states 
were marginalized and excluded from participation in international politics and its premier arena, 
the United Nations Organization. Many look at them with derision and write them off as the 
“accidents of history.” International politics, critics say, ought to be left for the elephants and not 
the mice. 
Though the microstates were sovereign states for centuries, well before many of the states 
who denied them membership, they did not receive membership in the United Nations or its 
predecessor the League of Nations for seven decades. Following hotly contested bids in the 
League and United Nations Specialized Agencies and failed diplomatic efforts at membership, 
each microstate gained membership by acclamation in quick succession from 1990-1993, with 
no dissent. This sudden removal of any obstacle is puzzling and prompts the question: 
Why were the European microstates denied admission for so long to the United Nations 
until the early 1990’s when they were accepted with no opposition? 
It would be safe to assume that the non-participation of the microstates stems from some 
sort of bias on the part of giants. The conventional wisdom is that the microstates long had little 
to contribute to international politics and were not capable of making any impact on this level. 
With no armies, little national identity to distinguish themselves from their larger neighbor and 
arcane forms of government, the microstates are often perceived as innocuous, incapable of 
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influencing or directing global politics. They are just as often the subjects of farce and trivia as 
they are the subjects of serious investigation. 
Surely, any claim that these microstates wielded any significant power could not be 
supported, common sense would argue; public discourse and academic work over the last half-
century have argued that it is their limited sovereignties, small size, incapacity to fulfill Charter 
obligations and unwillingness to join the United Nations that kept them out. While certain 
authors have accepted these justifications, they only camouflage what was really taking place. In 
this thesis, I argue that contrary to conventional wisdom, the European microstates did in fact 
have the potential to hold this powerful position, which the existing power blocs wished to deny 
them. 
After presenting well-reasoned rejections of previously existing arguments, I argue that 
the political groups present in the General Assembly from 1945-1989 made the admission of new 
members with the anticipated voting behaviors of the microstates undesirable for the status quo. 
The existing blocs in power would not have benefited from the inclusion of the microstates that 
would lessen the ease with which those blocs could pass or block resolutions. This fear of a 
potential check to the established power created a barrier to admission: a wall too high for the 
microstates to climb, but which other states of similar foreign policies (e.g. Austria, Finland and 
Ireland) could overcome. In short, for states with the geopolitical positions of the microstates, 
entry to the United Nations required a level of tenacity and persistence to overcome the barriers 
raised by their political positions which the microstates could not muster. 
This work is not intended exclusively for those interested in the small states of Europe, as 
its hypothesis could be extended to other states that share a similar foreign policy position. These 
states too would face steep barriers in their attempts to join the United Nations. One might even 
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argue that all states face barriers to entry in the United Nations or any international organization 
based on their foreign policy stances. By nature of their political position, the barriers that the 
microstates faced were especially high and the microstates lacked the capacity to overcome them 
until the barriers were later lowered. 
To arrive at this point, we must examine the political topography of the United Nations. 
As the General Assembly has not had a single character throughout its entire history but has 
rather evolved, shifting with the changing geopolitical climate, I will refrain from characterizing 
the actors of the United Nations into blocs once and forever. Instead, I look at the United Nations 
in two eras, 1945-1960 and 1960-1989. After establishing preliminary information about the 
political system in the General Assembly, information about the European microstates 
themselves and dispelling previous arguments, I present my argument that the microstates were 
politically unacceptable to the powers in the United Nations which in turn created obstacles to 
admission that the microstates could not overcome. 
To support my thesis, I first present and explain a model for the barriers to the 
microstates in the time period from 1945-1960 when Cold War politics dominated the General 
Assembly. Second, I outline and explain a model for the barriers to the microstates in the time 
period from 1960-1989 when the North-South split between developed and developing countries 
dominated the General Assembly. This period ends not only with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, the most obvious shift in world politics, but also with the unraveling of the Non-Aligned 
Movement which reigned supreme over the United Nations for three decades. Certainly these 
periods overlap, as the Cold War never truly subsided from the General Assembly’s agenda until 
1992 and decolonization resolutions were raised from the first session. Nonetheless, this thesis 
separates the two time periods for reasons of simplicity. 
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The structure of my thesis is as follows. Chapter One presents the rules of the game. This 
includes conditions of admission of new members, the voting system in the General Assembly, 
the concepts of sovereign equality and ways with which we can analyze voting behavior. This 
enables us to later understand the contours of the General Assembly and how the admission of 
the microstates would have changed the status quo. 
Chapter Two establishes common knowledge by presenting information on the European 
microstates. First, I give basic facts about the microstates and describe their forms of 
government, some of which are unique in the world. Second, I examine their relations with larger 
neighbor states, involving powers that they voluntary have deputed. Next, I describe their 
economic situations qualitatively and quantitatively where possible. Lastly, I explain why 
membership in international organizations is particularly attractive to the microstates. This 
information is a foundation for the following chapter in order to prepare the reader for arguments 
that have traditionally been used against expanding membership to the European microstates. 
Chapter Three gives these existing reasons and examines each one. I disprove each of the 
old hypotheses beginning with the argument that the microstates did not possess sufficient 
sovereign power to qualify as United Nations members. By pointing to other existing United 
Nations members that had equivalent or lesser sovereignty, I show that the microstates’ 
sovereignties were sufficient enough for them to qualify for membership. Then, I show that the 
argument that European microstates were too small is not a valid argument either based on the 
inclusion of states with disproportionately small populations from the inception of the United 
Nations and the gradual inclusion of states with limited territories decades in advance of the 
entry of the European microstates. Third, I contend that the argument that microstates were 
unwilling to join the United Nations is also incorrect based on their top priority of recognition 
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and extension of diplomatic contacts as outlined in the previous chapter. Last, I disprove the 
argument that the European microstates were incapable of membership in terms of upholding the 
Charter obligations toward financial contributions and the maintenance of international security. 
Here, I use evidence that countries were regularly admitted to the United Nations despite 
financial incapacity and the lack of militarized forces or unwillingness to participate in economic 
sanctions. I summarize these arguments as the following null hypotheses: 
HO-A: The European microstates had deputed too many of their sovereignties to be 
members of the United Nations. 
HO-B – The European microstates were too small in terms of geographic area and 
population to be members of the United Nations. 
HO-C – The European microstates did not wish to become members. 
 
HO-D – The European microstates were not capable of fulfilling United Nations Charter 
obligations. 
Chapters Four and Five are dedicated to my alternate hypothesis that the powerful blocs 
of the General Assembly created a barrier which the microstates could not overcome but other 
states with similar foreign policies but greater resources could. Chapter Four looks at the first 
time period, 1945-1960, and the Cold War politics that took place in the General Assembly 
during that period. I begin with the context of the period to establish what was at stake for East 
and West adversaries. Then, I present a conceptual argument that analyzes the benefits of any 
actor in a bipolar regime with either side lacking the power to enact resolutions on its own and 
requiring the aid of a group of centrist states. This conceptual argument is based around the 
hypothesis that: 
HA-A: In a bipolar system where neither side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to 
pass resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1945-1960), a new actor who is perceived 
to enter at the center will face opposition from the existing actors resulting in barriers to 
that state gaining membership. 
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 I show how the European microstates would have entered as centrist states within this model 
and that no group, neither the poles nor the centrists, would support their admissions as the costs 
of securing passage or blockage of a resolution become steeper with the inclusion of new centrist 
members and existing centrist states see their positions weakened as they become replaceable. I 
then support this model as a true representation of Cold War politics in the United Nations by 
presenting evidence of both poles and a centrist ground existing. Following that, I argue that 
within this context, the European microstates would have certainly been centrists. To conclude, I 
test my thesis against the cases of Austria, Finland, Ireland and ex-colonial countries and show 
that their persistence in lobbying for membership or ambiguous stance enabled them to 
overcome obstacles that the European microstates could not. My hypothesis holds up to this test 
and shows that while opposition to membership was surmountable for some states, it was not for 
the microstates. 
Chapter Five looks at the following time period, 1960-1989, when the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) rose to power and dominated the General Assembly. After providing context, 
I again use a conceptual model that features two poles, except this time one of the poles is vastly 
more powerful than the other and requires no support from the center in gaining passage of its 
favored resolutions. In this case, it is advantageous for the powerful bloc to discriminate against 
new members with whom it would disagree. At the same time, it would be welcoming of new 
members with whom it would agree. I build the conceptual argument around the following 
hypothesis: 
HA-B: In a bipolar system where one side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to pass 
resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1960-1989), a new actor who is perceived to 
enter with the minority bloc will face opposition from the powerful bloc resulting in 
barriers to that state gaining membership. 
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I then place this model into the context of the actual politics taking place at the time and show 
that while the dominant NAM lowered the standards of admission for new members who would 
support its agenda, it did not extend the same courtesy to the European microstates. I then 
provide evidence that the European microstates would have voted with the former colonial 
powers in North-South issues. Finally, I argue that the loss of cohesion within the NAM that took 
place at the end of the 1980’s and the concurrent collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe put 
international politics into a period of chaos during which there was no organized opposition to 
the European microstates. Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino were in turn 
welcomed as states looked for new coalition partners. 
My thesis concludes by discussing how political concerns outweigh any codified 
procedure of admission in international organizations. My hypotheses invite more inspection 
from those who may spatially model and prove the regime I describe. This way admissions 
attempts in other organizations can be examined with regards to their political contexts. 
Just as the elephant does not fear the mouse for its sheer size (certainly there are other 
small animals that it does not mind), the giants of the United Nations did not fear the microstates 
for their size, but rather their character. The thesis proves that the common explanations based 
around sovereignty, size, capacity and willingness do not suffice and points instead toward 
political attitudes. I say that we should stop focusing on the mouse, but instead focus on its roar. 
That is to say, it was not the microstates themselves that were unacceptable, but their positions in 
the context of General Assembly voting. 
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C h a p t e r  O n e  
I m p o r t a n t  A s p e c t s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  S y s t e m  
 Before looking at the European microstates themselves, in order to understand their 
exclusion from the United Nations we must understand the basic system of the General 
Assembly. This chapter present information on the voting procedure of the General Assembly, 
the key concept of sovereign equality, why sovereign equality mattered so much to the European 
microstates and methods with which scholars have modeled voting in the General Assembly. 
This establishes the rules of the game that I will use to argue as to how General Assembly 
politics made the microstates unacceptable. 
General Assembly Voting  
 Voting in the United Nations General Assembly is governed by Article 18 of the Charter 
which reads: 
1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.  
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds 
majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: 
recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the 
members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship 
Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members 
to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the 
expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and 
budgetary questions. 
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of 
questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the 
members present and voting.1 
In the history of the United Nations, nearly all resolutions have been approved by two-thirds 
majority or acclamation.2 From this fact, I will assume in my models that a bloc must contain 
                                                 
1 United Nations Charter, Article 18. 
2 Goodrich, 172. Peterson, 74-77. 
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two thirds of all votes in the Assembly in order to control the agenda. That bloc will therefore 
wish to build, maintain or extend that supermajority when it comes to the admission of new 
members. Conversely, any opposition or minority bloc needs not a majority of votes but only a 
third of votes to effectively oppose the dominant bloc and stop its agenda. For those reasons we 
must look at the two-thirds barrier as the limit above which a dominant bloc may control the 
admission of new members as it wishes and below which, the minority bloc may block the 
admission of new members as it wishes. Member-states have four voting options on any 
resolution: yes, no, abstain or absent. An absent vote may be cast even if the delegate is present 
but wishes not to have any opinion recorded on an issue. 
Sovere ign Equal i ty  
The concept of sovereign equality in international law emerges from Woodrow Wilson 
who, in establishing his doctrine toward Latin America, argued that just as people enjoyed equal 
rights within a state, states too should be treated on an equal basis on the international stage.3 
This was a major departure from the previous world order wherein the European “Great Powers” 
decided all issues of international concern. The international regime of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries featured the emergence of multilateral diplomacy through such important conferences 
as the Congress of Vienna, the Berlin Conference and the Paris Peace Conference. Though 
multilateral, they were certainly exclusionary, being dominated by a core of Europe’s large 
military powers.  
When Wilson carried his view of sovereign equality into the Paris Peace Conference and 
secured its role in the League of Nations,4 naturally there was trepidation on the part of large 
                                                 
3 Klein, 64. 
4 Ibid., 67, 69. 
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states. This new system of equality went against the old hierarchy of states.5 This had less to do 
with the actual size of states than it did their previous presence in international affairs. China, 
Brazil, Spain and Australia for example, were viewed by the European powers as “small states.” 
The terminology “small state” truly referred to any state that was not a “Great Power,” regardless 
of size. The powers did not want to give up their control of world affairs and sought a tiered 
system by which they would retain certain checks over the rest of the League. Hence, it was 
decided to have two principal organs: the Assembly, in which all member-states may participate, 
and the Council, in which the Great Powers would have final say and, as it was later 
compromised, there would be rotating membership for the small states.6 The Powers saw the 
Council as responsible for “the real work of the League” and were privately frustrated that small 
states received any presence whatsoever.7 The entire concept of the League was a seismic shift in 
international relations in that the consent of a greater amount of states was sought. Here, the 
world’s most powerful states devolved sovereignty to the rest of the world for the first time in 
history. To allay the American Senate’s fears of ceding too much power to smaller states, the 
drafters included a provision for a requirement of unanimity on nearly all decisions of the 
League under Article 5, though ultimately the United States defected nonetheless.8 Increasingly, 
it was the barrier of unanimity-building with small states that led to the frustration of powerful 
members and their resulting abandonment of the League in the prelude to World War II. 
Mussolini purportedly stated, in announcing Italy’s departure from the League, “the League is 
very well when sparrows shout, but no good at all when eagles fall.” 
                                                 
5 Rappard, 546. 
6 Ibid., 557. 
7 Ibid., 550, 553. 
8 Walters, 46. 
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Later, the tradition of sovereign equality made its way into the United Nations. As early 
as the Quebec Conference of 1943, the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union agreed 
on the importance of sovereign equality to the organization while maintaining a primary role for 
the Great Powers as a world police.9 The dissolution of the League of the Nations led the three 
powers to conduct multiple meetings throughout World War II in order to plan for the rebuilding 
of Europe after the war’s end. In the planning for the United Nations, the powers recognized the 
importance of maintaining the concept of sovereign equality but wanted to lessen the 
disproportionate power that small states could wield due to the requirement of unanimity. This 
too was a painful sacrifice on the part of the Allies as the conferences of Quebec, Tehran, Yalta 
and Dumbarton Oaks had reasserted the concept of great power primacy.10 
In laying out the Organization’s founding principles, sovereign equality was reflected in 
Article 2, Section 1 of the United Nations Charter which reads: “The Organization is based on 
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”11 This was expounded in Article 18, 
cited above, which guarantees one state, one vote.12 
The General Assembly with its two-thirds majority requirement was adopted so that 
small states may be welcome but cannot impede the progress and functionality of the 
organization. This supranational form of governance is an even greater concession of sovereignty 
for any state as resolutions are passed whether that state agreed with it or not. Though resolutions 
are non-binding,13 they carry much political weight and even led to serious action. The Uniting 
for Peace Resolution of 1950, stemming from United States frustration over the paralysis of the 
Security Council, enabled the General Assembly to authorize peacekeeping forces in cases where 
                                                 
9 Klein, 112, 110. 
10 Ibid., 110. 
11 United Nations Charter, Article 2, Section 1. 
12 Bentiwch & Martin, 12. 
13 Ryan, 42. 
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the Security Council has been prevented from taking action.14 This was invoked to allow 
peacekeepers to take a role in Korea and the Suez Canal.15  
This disproportionate voting power small states retain in comparison to their size is rather 
important, then, in the eyes of the larger powers. At the outset of the United Nations, the Kremlin 
expressed fears that it would be overshadowed by small countries who did not contribute nearly 
as much to the war effort that the Soviet Union did.16 Throughout the years of the organization, 
the great powers grew further frustrated with the admissions of small states. American Deputy 
Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Richard Gardner stated in 1965, at the 
height of the entry of postcolonial states, that the influx of new members distorted the real global 
balance of power.17 Yet the international community as a whole remained firm in its acceptance 
of new members and in denial that they in any way diminished the efficiency of international 
politics. Before his passing, Dag Hammarskjöld commented, “Even though the United States, for 
example, has merely one vote, its ability to influence gives it strength and comparative 
advantage.”18 His statement warns that though grand states may bemoan the equality of small 
states, they ought to recognize that influence tends to come from the big states upon the little, not 
the other way around. 
Sovere ign Equal i ty  and the European Microstates  
There is no doubt that the European microstates hold sovereign equality to be quite dear. 
To states, for which it is often difficult to voice their points of view, sovereign equality gives as 
much say in the General Assembly or other international organizations as even the largest states. 
Former Andorran Foreign Minister Juli Minoves-Triquell illustrates that point: 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 41. 
15 Diehl, 490. 
16 Klein, 110. 
17 Gardner, 233. 
18 Ibid., 234. 
 
SNYDER | 19 
International law guarantees sovereign equality of states, regardless of size and 
population. Therefore in large countries, the task of the Foreign Ministry is to concentrate 
on defending the interests of the state and the projection of community values outside the 
borders of the country. In smaller states, though, we have the additional task of making 
ourselves known, often explaining from scratch the reality of our country in all its 
complexity.19 
For the microstates, it provides an equal say and makes other states more attentive to their 
opinions. This makes the microstates active players in international politics; no longer are they 
pushed about by larger countries without any concern for policies’ effects on the microstates. 
However, we must be careful not overstate sovereign equality’s importance in the 
microstates’ foreign policies. First and foremost, the primary objective for the microstates to join 
the United Nations was as a way of affirming their existences. Secondly, the microstates wanted 
to use their membership as a method of extending bilateral diplomatic relations with countries 
with whom they could not afford to establish traditional bilateral relations. Given their limited 
foreign policy agendas, the actual participation in international decision making seems to have 
lesser importance for the microstates. In fact, their top priorities have often been procedural or 
dealing with the codification of international law and Security Council reform. 
Coincidence  and Bloc  Voting 
To have an informed discussion on how states vote, it is important to first have a 
methodological basis. Many analysts of United Nations bloc voting use a Coincidence Index (CI) 
system to plot coincidence in the General Assembly. One example is that of Mexican diplomat 
and researcher Miguel Marín-Bosch. To show how different states voted with each other, his CI 
is on a scale of 0 to 1000 with 0 being no agreement between two states and 1000 being absolute 
agreement. As abstentions are not necessarily for or against a certain resolution, Marín-Bosch 
                                                 
19 Minoves-Triquell. (Convivències), 5. 
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counts votes in which one state abstained and the other voted yes or no as a half vote. His 
formula is as follows: 
20   
Other analysts’ formulas do not fundamentally differ and will be used in this thesis equally.21 
 Though CI’s demonstrate similarity in voting, they do not prove collaboration on an 
issue. The General Assembly sees many binary combinations that lack easy explanation as the 
states do not share alliances. The first fifteen years of the General Assembly had Guatemala and 
France, Mexico and Belgium and the Republic of China and Norway all paired with CI’s greater 
than 950 though these states are not traditionally partners with each other.22 
While there are many individual actors who have made their decisions once and for 
themselves according to their own standards, it important to recognize that the United Nations 
operates as a community. Cohen points out, “[i]t is… necessary to emphasize that the decision-
maker here is the community at large rather than any one state.”23 Thus, as we look at the 
attitudes of the organization as a whole, we must understand the driving forces within the United 
Nations that arrive at these decisions: the voting blocs. For these reasons it is useful not to look 
so much at individual voters on either pole or in the center but to look at those blocs as a whole 
and then the microstates, or other states on which we may predict their behavior, as individuals 
in relation to these blocs. 
Why the United Nations and not  other s tages  o f  internat ional  pol i t i c s? 
The General Assembly was of course but one theater of conflict during the Cold War. 
The belligerents often found it more practical to resort to unilateral action outside the restraints 
                                                 
20 Marín-Bosch, 118. 
21 Holloway, Newcombe, Hovet, et al. 
22 Marín-Bosch, 143. 
23 Cohen, 1127-28. 
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of the United Nations Charter. The Berlin blockade, Soviet quelling of Czech revolts and 
militarized conflict in Vietnam all attest to this fact. There has always been debate as to the 
effectiveness of the United Nations and recent United States administrations’ disinterest in the 
organization also evidences this.  
Nonetheless, the General Assembly has always retained an important role as the premier 
stage of multilateral international politics and a forum in which the rivals have sought advantage. 
In the context of the Cold War, it allowed for a space of conflict without confrontation in that the 
United States and the Soviet Union could compete for influence without the consequences of 
militarized war.24 The United Nations is also advantageous in that it commands a level of 
respect, prestige and legitimacy that uni- and multilateral actions cannot match. On the 
international stage, an opinion is universally accepted when the world gives its assent through 
the United Nations. Though individual states may disagree, an approved resolution of the United 
Nations carries a sacrosanct weight, providing strong support in any international dispute. No 
state wants to abandon the United Nations entirely and let world opinion be developed without 
its input. 
The General Assembly’s political dimension is of great importance as resolutions have 
the ability to shape the geopolitical discourse and are generally considered to be the opinion of 
the world. These symbolic acts influence other interactions between states. The amount of 
lobbying expended by states on General Assembly resolutions is proof ipso facto of the 
importance that states consider resolutions to have. If states were truly indifferent about 
resolutions in the General Assembly, they would simply ignore the United Nations (as some 
recent American presidents have tended to do). While before the institution of the United 
Nations, international opinion was guided exclusively by the great powers, this power, along 
                                                 
24 Russell, 324. 
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with that to authorize peacekeeping forces, had been devolved to all states equally through the 
General Assembly. Just as had been done in the League, in order to maintain some leverage, the 
great powers hold permanent seats on the Security Council, again with a provision for the 
rotating membership of small states. 
From state  to  member-s tate  
In order to become a member of the United Nations, states must go through a certain 
procedure and meet certain criteria enumerated in Article 4, Section 1 of the Charter: 
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which 
accept the obligations in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the 
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.25 
The judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, was asked for 
an advisory ruling in 1949 on what specific criteria are necessary for membership and listed: (1) 
statehood, (2) peace-loving, (3) acceptance of the obligations of the Charter, (4) ability to carry 
out those obligations in the judgment of the United Nations, (5) the willingness to do so in the 
judgment of the United Nations. The court went further stating, “[A] Member of the United 
Nations… is not juridicially entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on 
conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article.”26 More explicitly, a 
member may only consider these given criteria when deciding the admissibility of a state. In 
theory, it may consider neither size nor political attitudes of potential members. 
The first criterion, statehood, requires some further clarification. In evaluating an entity’s 
statehood, many observers pay attention to the attribute of sovereignty. The Montevideo 
Convention of 1933 established four criteria that an entity must possess in order to be considered 
a state: a permanent population, a clearly defined territory, an effective government and the 
                                                 
25 United Nations Charter, Article 4, Section 1. 
26 Admission of a State to the United Nations. Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice Reports, 1947-1948 . 
57. 
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capacity to engage in international relations.27 Many scholars consider this, however, to be 
insufficient, as many sub-state entities like colonies, provinces, Soviet Republics or states 
possessed these qualities. For that reason, many consider sovereignty (often used 
interchangeably with the term independence as it is in this thesis) to be a necessary criterion for 
statehood. In the United Nations, sovereignty takes precedence over other criteria for 
statehood.28 
The requirement that a state be peace-loving originally pertained to those states who were 
opposed to the Axis, the original member-states of the United Nations.29 This criterion is seldom 
invoked, although United States Ambassador Edward Perkins once raised objections to the 
candidature of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on this ground in 
1992.30 Undoubtedly, states which are not entirely peace-loving have been admitted to the 
United Nations. However no objections have ever been raised in reference to the European 
microstates on this criterion and it will not be pursued in this thesis. 
Procedurally, in order for a country to become a member state, it must first submit its 
candidature to the UN Security Council which may choose whether or not to consider an 
application.31 If worthy of consideration, the Security Council then refers the application to the 
Committee on the Admission of New Members, a standing committee composed of one 
representative of each Security Council member.32 The Committee then makes a 
recommendation to the Security Council who votes on the recommendation. Based on this 
approval, the General Assembly then votes on membership. 
                                                 
27 Grant, 5. 
28 Goodrich, 89. More on the sovereignties of the European microstates on pages 31-42. 
29 Ibid., 90. 
30 United Nations Document A/46/PV.86. 
31 Goodrich, 93. 
32 Ibid., 93. 
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Conclusion 
Now that we understand the structure of the United Nations, we may analyze the validity 
of explanations for the exclusion of the European microstates. Voting in the United Nations 
requires a two-thirds majority for nearly all issues, making building that coalition or a blocking 
one-third coalition, the goal of any voting bloc. The concept of sovereign equality plays a most 
important role as it levels the playing field and states’ size, once they are accepted, no longer 
matters. The big states’ distaste of this principle makes them tentative before admitting a small 
state. Despite other forums of international interaction, the United Nations has always been the 
most important for its prestige and the legitimacy that its decisions have. Importantly, we 
understand the legitimate basis upon which a member-state is supposed to judge the admission of 
new states. The basis constructed in this chapter is instrumental in understanding the practice of 
admission discussed in Chapter Three and the political functions of the General Assembly 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five. 
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C h a p t e r  T w o  
T h e  M i c r o s t a t e s  
 Let us now turn our attention to the European microstates, the cases at the focus of this 
thesis. In order to understand why they were excluded from the United Nations, it is important to 
first lay out some basic information about these states. This chapter begins with a discussion on 
how I arrived at the sample set of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. Then, I 
provide information on the governmental structures, histories, limited sovereignties, geographic 
size and population of each of the microstates. This information will be important in dispelling 
the alternate explanations that have been so far given, to be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Three. 
What is a microstate? 
 Though there is no strict definition of what constitutes a microstate, as size is a relative 
term, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino constitute a distinct group of states from 
other small countries in the world. They are bound by the facts that they are independent 
countries with populations under 100,000, an extremely small area (granted, this is a relative 
term) and are located on the European continent. Each of these states has a well established 
history dating back hundreds of years (San Marino is the oldest, its history dating to 301 AD, and 
Liechtenstein is the newest, an intact entity since the 14th Century). Accordingly, these states are 
not the remnants of colonialism but have long been their own international persons. Additionally, 
they hold the distinction of being non-members of the United Nations for most of the 
organization’s existence in common. As such, these four countries form the focus of my thesis. 
The only other state with wide international recognition that is not currently a member of 
the United Nations is Vatican City. The Vatican occupies a unique place in world politics in that 
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it is both sovereign over its own territory and the seat of an international religious organization. 
It is dissimilar from the other countries in the sense that it has no permanent population, citizenry 
or industry. The Vatican has repeatedly stated that it does not wish for full membership in the 
United Nations and maintains observer status with full rights (except for that to vote) as granted 
in 2004. 
Additionally, we must differentiate these states from entities with small area and some 
degree of sovereignty but limited international recognition. Due to competing territorial claims, 
ethnic rivalries and Cold War rivalries, there were and continue to be numerous state-like regions 
that satisfy many of the traditional criteria for statehood except that of international recognition. 
Some countries went through a protracted process that eventually led to their membership in the 
United Nations Organization. The two Germanys and two Koreas were not deemed admissible 
until 1972 and 1992, respectively. The political controversy that today surrounds the recognition 
of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Kosovo and the fact that their two most prominent 
detractors (the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, respectively) hinder the 
possibility that either will be admitted in the near future. Examples of state-like entities like 
South Ossetia, Palestine and Nagorno-Karabakh are much thornier issues which require a much 
wider scope than I might be able to cover in this thesis. The simplest explanation for these 
entities’ absences is that their situations are highly controversial and membership is unachievable 
without massive geopolitical controversy, yet this is merely conjecture. There exist no competing 
territorial claims, ethnic rivalries or geopolitical instability surrounding the statuses of the 
European microstates. 
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G o v e r n m e n t a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  
The next part of this chapter focuses on unique aspects of the microstates divided by 
category. I begin with some information on the governmental structures of each state, 
accompanied by a table to organize those data. Second, I discuss the issue of sovereignty and 
detail how each state has deputed certain practical, political and economic sovereignties to its 
larger neighbor state. Next, I present the economic situations of each of these countries mostly 
dependent on qualitative data. Finally, I discuss the desires of the microstates to join 
intergovernmental organizations and the goals that membership helps them fulfill. Some of the 
information included in this section is summarized in Table I. 
Andorra  
Located high in the Pyrenees between France and Spain, Andorra is a truly unique 
political manifestation. Inhabited for at least four millennia, the Principality was first formally 
recognized as an independent entity by Charlemagne in 806 AD.33 In order to understand the 
political structure of Andorra prior to its 1993 Constitutional reform, we must look at the Co-
Prince system. This form of governance is the only one of its kind in the world. Dating back to 
Andorra’s founding document, the Paréatge of 1278, feudal powers were equally shared between 
the Bishop of Urgell, a nearby Spanish diocese, and the Count of Foix, a nearby commune in 
modern France.34 Throughout history, the Count of Foix’s powers passed higher through 
aristocratic ascendancy to the French royal house and today the French Republic’s President. As 
Andorra is remarkably remote from Paris, the Co-Prince President appoints a permanent delegate 
who resides in nearby Perpignan, France.35 France viewed the maintenance of Andorra’s 
                                                 
33 Rogatnick, 24. 
34 Ibid., 27. 
35 Ibid., 48. 
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 international affairs as its exclusive responsibility stating: “The external relations of the Valleys 
of Andorra are guaranteed by the President of the French Republic in his role as Co-Prince.”36 
As for the Episcopal Co-Prince, his capacity as Co-Prince of Andorra has no bearing on Spanish 
influence. Furthermore, the Catholic Church has no power over the Episcopal Co-Prince’s 
actions within the Principality aside from the power to appoint. The Pope does not issue any 
specific instructions on the governance of Andorra.37 Formerly, the Co-Princes had the authority 
to execute judicial powers, administer public order and supervise internal security. 
Feeling the cumbersome duties of operating simultaneously as French President and 
Andorran Co-Prince, President Valérie Giscard d’Estaing relented to persistent requests from the 
Consell General and initiated procedures to draft an Andorran constitution, devolving powers to 
the Andorran people in the mid-1970’s.38 The constitution, introduced in 1993, severely limited 
the roles of the Co-Princes and allowed for the creation of executive ministries, most notable of 
which is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, under control of Andorran civil servants. It also 
introduced an Executive Council to assume the internal responsibilities formerly maintained by 
the Co-Princes.39 
Liechtenste in 
 Nestled in the Alpine mountains between Switzerland and Austria, Liechtenstein united 
under the fiefdom of the Liechtenstein family in 1396.40 The Liechtenstein family’s true 
motivation in acquiring this land was to reclaim a permanent seat on the Diet of the Holy Roman 
Empire of which Liechtenstein was then a part.41 In fact, the royal family did not even inhabit the 
territory until the 20th Century. Upon the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, 
                                                 
36 Duursma, 360. 
37 Ibid., 368. 
38 Tomàs. 
39 Duursma, 321. 
40 Rogatnick, 74. The fiefdom gained its status as an autonomous principality in 1719. 
41 Beattie 16. 
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Liechtenstein became a state of the Confederation of the Rhine. When the Confederation 
dissolved in 1866, rather than becoming an exclave of the German Empire, Liechtenstein opted 
for independence and affiliation with Austria. 
 Internally, the Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy with a 
democratically elected Diet (the Landtag). In 2003, voters approved a constitutional reform that 
granted Prince Hans-Adam II greater powers, perhaps the only time in history that power has 
willfully been conceded by an electorate.42 
Monaco  
 Located along the Côte D’Azur, the territory that is now Monaco has been inhabited 
since Roman times. The Grimaldi dynasty conquered the territory that had previously been a 
monastery in 1191 and officially became a sovereign Principality in 1215. Incapable of providing 
for its own defense, the Grimaldi family frequently sought protection from its larger neighbors, 
variously being a Spanish, French and Sardinian protectorate until complete sovereignty in 1861. 
The Principality is governed by its Prince, currently Albert II, and a democratically elected 
parliament and her Chief of Government, the Princely-appointed Minister of State. 
San Marino  
 Today an enclave of Italy, according to legend, the Most Serene Republic of San Marino 
was founded in 301 AD by Saint Marino, a mason forced to leave Dalmatia under persecution 
for his Catholicism. Marino found refuge on Mount Titano, a peak at the center of the modern 
day Republic, and there established a fiefdom. During the Risorgimento, San Marino retained its 
independence by sheltering Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi while forces loyal to Italian 
King Victor Emanuel II pursued him. Upon conquest of Italy, Garibaldi allowed San Marino to 
retain its independence as a favor. 
                                                 
42 “Liechtenstein prince wins powers.” BBC. 
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 San Marino also has a unique governance system. Her citizens elect the Grand and 
General Council, its parliament, which then elect the Captains Regent, San Marino’s heads of 
state. Two Captains Regent serve concurrent six-month terms and may not run for re-election. 
Sovereignty 
Before delving into the circumstances of each state, let us first take an overview of the 
concept of sovereignty. Often used interchangeably with “independence,” sovereignty is 
understood to be the condition when, in the words of longtime Italian judge on the International 
Court of Justice Dionisio Anzilotti, “the State has over it no other authority than that of 
international law.”43 It should be understood, and it is stressed by many authors who discuss the 
microstates, that sovereignty is a relative and not an absolute quality.44 Even the largest and most 
powerful countries cannot be said to be entirely independent, basing their decisions on the 
behavior of other countries around them and being mindful of the consequences of their 
decisions.45 Especially in today’s world of globalization and interdependence, states are 
increasingly willing to give up certain powers to international organizations and neighbor states 
that at one time were solely the sovereign power of states. 
Given that sovereignty is a relative concept, there is no denying that the European 
microstates have de facto incredibly limited sovereignties with respect to other countries of the 
world. One of stated that the microstates “belong to a grey area on the border-line between 
constitutional law and international law, where it is not easy to distinguish autonomy from 
sovereignty.”46 Though provisions in treaties and constitutions guarantee the de jure recognition 
                                                 
43 Cohen, 1139. 
44 Rogatnick 206. Sovereignty is a murky concept and when speaking of its relative quantity, many international 
legal scholars instead refer to independence. I use the two terms interchangeably to remain consistent with other 
writers on the subject of European microstates. 
45 Kohn 549. 
46 Adam, 84. 
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of its independence, each European microstate has had to rely throughout history on one or two 
larger neighbors to provide services where needed due to its limited resources, its “sister states.” 
We may separate this dependence into practical, political and economic domains.47 Practical 
cooperation is how the microstate and sister state will coordinate on issues like the coordination 
of border crossings, control of radio frequencies and other practical apolitical matters. Political 
cooperation is how two states will coordinate on political issues which can be seen in 
constitutions, diplomatic and consular matters, defense issues and conformity in foreign policy. 
Economic cooperation involves how two states will coordinate on economic, fiscal, banking, 
customs, commercial and gambling issues. 
Andorra 
Practical matters between Andorra and her neighbors extend to border patrol, postal 
unions and radio frequency agreements. The French government asserted itself in regulating 
Andorra’s radio frequencies as a result of Radio Andorra, a state-owned station, running 
programming on frequencies already occupied by other European stations in 1947.48 The 
situation escalated as France jammed the frequencies and refused Andorran shepherds the 
formerly customary right to graze their sheep on the French side of the border. In response, 
Andorra received assistance from Madrid which eased restrictions on the flow of Spaniards into 
the Co-Principality whose business compensated for the lost revenue from the French radio 
interference. Eventually a settlement was reached to the War of the Wavelengths in 1963 
permitting Spanish regulation of Radio Andorra. 
Though de jure they have been marginalized to a ceremonial role, the Co-Princes still 
enjoy a great deal of influence on Andorran internal affairs. For example, though many 
                                                 
47 This separation of domains is used by Duursma, 125-126. 
48 Rogatnick. 44. 
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Andorrans are open-minded on the issue of abortion, the Bishop of Urgell’s religious beliefs 
make such an operation unacceptable.49 As such, Andorrans wish not to offend the Co-Prince 
and agitate him to the point where he would resign his position. Similarly, the French Co-Prince 
President’s threat to resign his post in the wake of 2009’s G-20 Summit that named Andorra on a 
list of tax havens, forced concessions on the part of Andorra which responded by easing bank 
secrecy laws.50 
In terms of security, Andorra is a non-militarized and traditionally neutral country.51 
Through the 1993 Treaty of Vicinage, the Co-Principality is assured consultation and the 
possibility of military assistance from Spain and France in case of attack. Andorran nationals 
may receive consular assistance at either Spanish or French embassies, missions and consulates 
in countries where Andorra does not represent itself.52 In these third countries, Spanish and 
French diplomats may represent Andorra but only if a specific framework for this has been 
established with the consent of both co-Princes.53 
Economically, customs unions bounded Andorra to Spain and France through an 
agreement with both powers in 1867.54 Today, Andorra is party to the larger European Union 
Customs Union (formerly European Community).55 Prior to the introduction of the euro, the 
French franc and Spanish peseta were both accepted with the latter seeing more frequent use 
though neither were regulated by treaty.56 The sister states have informal influence on fiscal 
matters, as previously mentioned, though neither the treaty of vicinage nor other agreements give 
any formal authority to either France or Spain. 
                                                 
49 Tomàs. 
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52 Duursma, 339, 347. 
53 Ibid. 
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SNYDER | 34 
Liechtenste in  
For practical concerns, Liechtenstein has had little reliance on Austria or Switzerland. 
Liechtenstein maintains its own police force and the three countries operate joint patrol of the 
borders.57 In appreciation of the Swiss assistance, Liechtenstein provides police officers to help 
maintain security at the World Economic Forum meetings every January in nearby Davos, 
Switzerland.58  
Politically, Switzerland and, in one case, Austria have a modest presence in Liechtenstein 
through defense, diplomatic and consular representation and juridical posts. As all Austria, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland are officially neutral, there are no formal guaranties of security 
between the countries.59 Though never contentious, Swiss troops have accidentally “invaded” 
Liechtenstein on numerous occasions during exercises.60 Formerly being diplomatically 
represented abroad by the Austrian foreign service from 1880 until 1918,61 Liechtenstein 
requested that Switzerland represent its interests in countries where it has no representation in 
1919.62 Liechtenstein’s agreement is similar in concept to Andorra’s with its neighbors but 
Vaduz went further and stipulated that any interaction with third states and action on behalf of its 
citizens abroad may only be taken at the Principality’s request.63 Liechtenstein remains free to 
establish its own diplomatic and consular representation, a freedom it has exercised by placing 
ambassadors in Austria, Belgium, Vatican City and Switzerland and permanent missions at 
multiple international installations.64 
                                                 
57 Beattie, 349-350. 
58 Ibid.. 
59 Duursma, 169. 
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Economically, Liechtenstein had long been tied to Austria before World War I. However 
the severe devastation wrought upon Vienna by the war caused the Landtag to denounce its 1852 
customs treaty with Austria in 1919 and replace it instead with a union with Switzerland which 
entered into effect in 1924.65 At the same time Liechtenstein transitioned from the severely 
depreciated Austrian kronen to the Swiss franc in 1920.66 This new union afforded other 
opportunities as it became an appendage of the European Free Trade Association in 1960. With 
the European movement toward a single market, Liechtenstein and Switzerland split as the 
Principality opted to join the European Economic Area by referendum in 1992.67 By nature of 
being a full EFTA member, Liechtenstein maintains its free trade privileges with Switzerland. 
Fiscally, Liechtenstein’s opaque banking practices have never been questioned by the Swiss, but 
rather the G-20 which pressured Liechtenstein into more transparent laws as it did Switzerland in 
2009.68 
Monaco  
France has a small presence in Monégasque practical issues as it provides the 
gendarmerie that patrols and maintains order in the Principality.69 There are no border guards. 
In terms of political cooperation, Monaco adopted its first Constitution in 1911 followed 
seven years later by the Franco-Monégasque Treaty of 17 July 1918 which remained until 2002 
the bedrock of relations between the states.70 For purposes of interpretation, the Treaty was 
accompanied by an exchange of letters. France initiated requests for the first treaty during World 
War I out of fear that ascendency to the throne may fall into the German side of the Grimaldi 
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family.71 The series of treaties introduced a significant French presence in Monaco’s domestic 
politics, security apparatus, consular and diplomatic system, foreign affairs and judicial branch. 
First, in terms of domestic governance, any pretender to the Monégasque Crown must be agreed 
upon with the French government and that Monaco will revert to a French protectorate in case of 
a vacancy on the throne.72 France may have, in theory, refused confirmation of a Monégasque 
pretender and thus incorporate Monaco into the Republic.73 The Franco-Monégasque Convention 
of 28 July 1930 introduced further limitations on the Monégasque executive branch. The Head of 
Government is not the Prime Minister of Monaco’s Parliament, but rather the Minister of State 
who is appointed by the Prince and is aided by three Government Counsellors.74 These leaders 
are not responsible to the Parliament, but rather to the Prince himself. As put forward in the 
Convention of 1930, the Minister of State as well as the Gouvernment Counsellor responsible for 
interior matters must both be career diplomat French nationals who come from a seconding 
process parallel to that of the judicial branch.75 Second, in terms of security, by the 1918 Treaty 
France guarantees Monaco’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and provides for 
it defense.76 Previously, Monaco had been neutral.77 Third, in terms of foreign relations, the 1918 
Treaty demands parfaite conformité of political, military, naval and economic interests between 
France and Monaco.78 In addition, under Article 2, first paragraph, Monaco may not ally itself 
with a third state without prior consent of France. 
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Monaco and France have shared a customs union since 1861.79 Monégasque use of the 
French franc was formalized in 194580 though today the Principality uses the euro as legal 
tender.81 In terms of economic limitations of sovereignty, France has repeatedly raised objections 
concerning Monaco’s loose fiscal policies though it has never protested the opulent Principality’s 
well-known gambling establishments. The Principality’s practice of low taxation and its active 
solicitation of companies to incorporate themselves on its territory led to high tensions between 
Paris and Monte-Carlo in the 1960’s. As French businesses evaded taxes by incorporating in 
Monaco, France accused her neighbor of being in violation of the 1918 Treaty’s stipulation on 
perfect conformity of economic interests.82 To resolve the problem, France resorted to pressure 
tactics outside of the treaty. Due to Monaco’s position as an enclave, France may coerce Monaco 
by controlling the thoroughfares into and out of the country. This was the case in 1962 when 
French dissatisfaction boiled over and France began controlling frontier posts, restricting the 
flow of goods and persons into and out of the Principality.83 After six months, Monaco relented 
and conceded to France a greater role for the Minister of State and increased taxation of foreign 
companies in Monaco. 
In 2002, France and Monaco revised their relations and repealed many of the limitations 
especially on the executive branch. Most importantly, the Minister of State no longer must be 
French, the succession of a new Prince no longer must be approved by France and there no 
longer must be a previously arranged verbal agreement on foreign policy positions.84 However, 
as this thesis analyses what forestalled Monaco’s entry into the United Nations, we must 
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recognize the limits on sovereignty present when Monaco was excluded with lesser appreciation 
for changes made later. 
San Marino  
In terms of practical matters, Italy and San Marino have been generally cooperative. San 
Marino was not permitted to establish its own television or radio stations until Italy permitted it 
to do so in 1987.85 There are no border guards between the two countries. 
Italy interfered with San Marino’s internal politics during the Communist regime of the 
post-war era. Unnerved by a Communist government so close by, Italy began slowing payments 
of subsidies in an unsuccessful attempt to undermine domestic confidence.86 Aside from this one 
dispute, relations have been historically harmonious between the two states. San Marino is 
officially neutral and there are no agreements between the Republic and its larger neighbor for 
security as this would go against San Marino’s policy of non-alliance. Diplomatically, San 
Marino allowed Italy to provide consular assistance to Sammarinese abroad by the Treaty of 
1939.87 However, there are no stipulations for Italian diplomatic representation on behalf of San 
Marino. 
Economically, San Marino entered into a customs union with Italy in 1939 that was 
replaced in 1992 with a union with the rest of the European Community (now European Union 
Customs Union).88 The Italian lira became the official tender of San Marino in 1862.89 This 
monetary union proved costly after the Second World War when inflation, unemployment and 
poverty struck San Marino, its links with Italy dragging it down.90 These dire economic 
conditions permitted a Communist regime to come to power. The Soviet Union provided 
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subsidies to try to assist the flailing Republic, but economic adversity persisted and the country 
would only regain strength after the Communist government was forced out in 1957.91 The lira 
now defunct, San Marino uses the euro as legal tender, governed by an agreement with the 
European Union.92 San Marino’s sovereign attempt to construct a casino as a source of revenue 
during the post Second World War depression aroused strong Italian opposition. Italy responded 
to what was perceived as a fiscal and moral threat by establishing passport controls and 
suspending payment of the Republic’s subsidies.93 In 1951, after two years of blockade, San 
Marino relented and shut down its casino, but only after this heavy interference by its larger 
neighbor. 
Discussion 
As we see, the microstates vary in the types of powers given to their larger neighbors and 
the extent to which they are given. Duursma ranks the states from most independent to least as 
Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and lastly Andorra.94 Eccardt disagrees based upon the 1993 
reframing of Andorra’s constitution which reduced the role of the French and Spanish co-princes 
to ceremonial positions.95 Weil believes that Monaco’s 2002 Treaty with France makes her 
continuity “no longer threatened by the sword of Damocles.”96 There can be no question that 
Liechtenstein possesses an unrivaled degree of sovereignty while, I believe, the other three 
microstates are all significantly restrained by their neighbors. 
Though it is tempting to generalize that having two sister states as opposed to one confers 
special privileges or more leeway to the microstate, this truly depends on the presence of the 
foreign state in the domestic government. Liechtenstein’s relations with Switzerland and Austria 
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have been minimally invasive and full sovereignty resides with the Prince. This allowed the 
Principality on the Rhine to balance its relations between its two neighbors and manage their 
influence. In practice, being a wedge instead of an enclave gave Liechtenstein alternatives when 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire Collapsed in 1918 and the Principality could change its alliance to 
Switzerland. San Marino, as an enclave, did not have this option when Italy collapsed following 
the Second World War along with the Italian lira. As a result, San Marino suffered with Italy, 
leading to the election of a Communist government prolonging the Republic’s misery for more 
than a decade.97 These cases show the opportunity afforded by a second neighbor as opposed to 
the limiting affect of encirclement. 
However, Andorra has not been as fortunate with its two neighbors. Though the War of 
the Wavelengths shows tactful balancing of Spanish and French interests, the outsized presence 
of France and the Bishop of Urgell in Andorra’s internal government established barriers to 
Andorrans’ sovereign political discourse and financial policies. It would seem that instead of the 
quantity of neighbors on which a microstate is dependent, more crucial to understanding the 
limits on sovereignty is the circumstantial involvement of the neighbors in governing the 
microstate. 
S o v e r e i g n  P o w e r s  R e t a i n e d  
Despite whatever limitations, it is important to remain aware of certain functions only 
practicable by sovereign states in which the microstates took part. International litigation before 
the International Court of Justice by Liechtenstein was received and ruled upon in Liechtenstein 
v. Guatemala, 1955.98 Such actions can only be brought by sovereign states.  
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In addition, the microstates have long established bilateral treaties with states other than 
their immediate neighbors. Notable among these are extradition treaties. These agreements are 
important to outside states who want to ensure that criminals may not take refuge in otherwise 
safe havens. In return, the microstates gain an affirmation of their sovereignties. States would not 
bother concluding extradition treaties with the microstates if there were guarantees that the 
microstate’s larger neighbor would instead secure any fugitive on that territory. To just name a 
few, Monaco concluded extradition treaties with Belgium in 1876, Spain in 1882, Russia in 
1883, Liberia in 1926 and the United States in 1939.99 San Marino has extradition agreements 
dating as far back as 1899 with the United Kingdom.100 This shows the serious with which other 
countries regarded the microstates, for were they really not sovereign states, these treaties would 
have been unnecessary. 
States’ declarations of war are also key indicators of their sovereignties, especially when 
it is not in conformity with its neighbor. After seeing battle on its own soil during World War II, 
San Marino declared war on Germany during the latter stages of the conflict in September 1944 
against the wishes of Italy.101 One scholar says that this declaration “demonstrates a true liberty 
of action in foreign relations.” Though Liechtenstein, like Switzerland, was a venue of much 
illicit activity during the War and though Hitler threatened a putsch of its government,102 it never 
took part in any hostilities nor did it declare war. 
Lastly, the microstates’ perceived sovereignties were recognized in the 1940’s by none 
other than the United Nations. Based on the obligations to protect and promote non-independent 
entities that seek to become independent listed in Articles 73 and 74 of the Charter, the 
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Organization annually produces a list of non-self-governing territories. In no iteration of the list, 
originally published in 1946 and most recently revised in 2002, were any of the European 
microstates ever recognized as non-self-governing.103 We can then deduce that the United 
Nations viewed them as sovereign independent states by their absence from this list. 
In the following chapter, I examine the arguments used against the microstates for reason 
of limited sovereignty. It is important then to keep in mind what has been above presented in 
order to dispute those claims and compare the microstates’ sovereignties to those of other states. 
Economic Statuses 
 Often caricaturized as the playgrounds of the wealthy, people do not often realize the 
industrial force and business presence that the European microstates have. While some quickly 
deride the microstates as tax havens and gambling harems, the microstates’ economic situations 
are robust and generate nearly all of their revenue from taxes. 
The European microstates, despite some occasional periods of turbulence, have been 
quite prosperous throughout the 20th Century and up until today. Despite a paucity of statistical 
information on these countries, I will attempt to assess the historic economic capacities of the 
countries using historical and some statistical information. 
Andorra 
 Following the Second World War, Andorra had difficulty establishing its economy in an 
impoverished Europe. Yet due to the political situation of its neighbor to the south, Spain, 
Andorra grew an industry as “Europe’s window into Spain;” an intermediary between free and 
fascist Europe. The Franco era became known in Andorra as the “years of Tergal, nylon and 
Duralex.”104 Later, Andorra would diversify into a financial and tourist center. With low taxes, 
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banking secrecy, a luxury tourism sector featuring spas and skiing slopes and abundant duty-free 
shopping, Andorra’s economy grew significantly giving it momentum into the post-Franco 
era.105 Andorra reported 0% unemployment in 1989. In Andorra’s first year of United Nations 
membership, it contributed $42,521 in dues.106 
Liechtenste in 
 Liechtenstein’s economy has been one of the strongest in the world, so much so that 
today it boasts the top GDP per capita of any country in the world.107 Untouched during World 
War II and with the benefit of an unaffected trade partner in Switzerland, Liechtenstein was 
insulated from the economic depression that blighted Europe in the 1940’s and 50’s. In 1949, 
Liechtenstein became the first net energy exporter of Europe.108 The Principality’s technically 
advanced goods (Liechtenstein is the leading exporter of dentures in the world) have insulated it 
from external shocks such as the 1970’s Oil Crisis. The Principality provides more jobs than its 
labor supply can support on its own. Accordingly, instead of Liechtenstein forming a part of 
“Greater Switzerland” some economic analysts call adjacent Swiss cantons and Austrian states 
“Greater Liechtenstein.”109 Liechtenstein has historically had such low unemployment that it can 
be measured in single digits with four unemployed persons in 1960 and three in 1980 though 
recent immigration has pushed those figures higher.110 Liechtenstein has long posted large 
budget surpluses. At the time of the United Nations’ debate on microstates during the 1960’s, 
Liechtenstein had a surplus of 6.1 Million CHF which grew to 25.6 M CHF in 1970 and 62.7 M 
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CHF in 1980.111 Clearly, Liechtenstein surpassed any minimum financial standard of capacity at 
any time of consideration. 
Monaco  
Monaco, with its casinos and posh lifestyle, has long been known as an opulent resort. 
Any argument that Monaco would be unable to contribute to the United Nations budget would be 
undermined by the fact that Monaco voluntarily paid dues for a long time, including $27,000 
toward the budget in 1964.112 Monaco’s observer mission to the United Nations, maintained 
from 1956 forward, evidences Monaco’s capacity to afford the human resources costs of sending 
a delegation to New York.113 By the mid-1960’s it paid an estimated $200,000 on all costs for 
the United Nations both in New York and on its home soil.114 In Monaco’s first year as a 
member it paid $59,530 in contributions.115 The Principality is adamant not to be 
mischaracterized by its luxurious reputation. As famous as her casinos are, they only bring in 3% 
of government revenue, the rest of which comes from her aggressively low business tax.116 
San Marino  
San Marino’s economy is largely based on industrial production and the service sector.117 
San Marino has seen more economic instability than the other European microstates. The crisis 
that followed World War II rendered San Marino so poor that its dire economic situation forced 
it to not consider applying for United Nations membership.118 San Marino holds a slightly lower 
tax rate than Italy, causing many otherwise Italian companies to register there as limited liability 
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corporations.119 San Marino, however, does not have a comparable taxation system with the 
other microstates due to pressure that Italy has placed on the small republic. Perhaps due to its 
stricter adherence to international tax norms than the other European microstates, San Marino 
has not seen as much prosperity. A report conducted in 1995 concluded that San Marino has a 
lower GDP per capita than the surrounding Italian regions of Emilia-Romagna and The 
Marche.120 Nonetheless, San Marino had sufficient wealth by the end of the 1980’s to establish 
an observer mission to the United Nations and apply for membership in 1992.121 Though 
information is limited, an educated guess would say that San Marino could long sufficiently 
satisfy the minimum financial obligations imposed by United Nations membership. 
 In sum, it is quite evident that the European microstates maintain robust economies. This 
information will be useful during the next chapter when I examine these data in relation to 
Article 17 of the United Nations Charter which obligates member-states to annual financial 
contributions. From this and a comparison with states that were allowed to join despite lesser 
financial capacities, I will debunk the alternate hypothesis that the microstates’ financial 
situations prevented them membership. 
Desire to Join International Organizations 
 The European microstates have constantly fought for recognition since their inceptions. 
With the emergence of globalized politics in the 20th Century, their campaigns to be noticed 
extended beyond Western Europe and to the world at large. Since the invention of international 
organizations, microstates have sought membership as a method of gaining the world’s attention, 
establishing diplomatic contacts and contributing some, albeit limited, input into international 
affairs. In this section I talk generally about the attractions of membership to microstates. 
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  As compared to larger states whose interest in world politics may be characterized by a 
desire to protect and promote interests in far away corners of the world, the microstates have a 
much simpler foreign policy. Atop the foreign policy objectives for each country is the assertion 
of its sovereignty and the state’s recognition by other sovereign states.122 Though there are some 
particular interests (e.g. Monaco places a great deal of energy into advocacy for marine 
protection), the microstates’ other top desire is to establish diplomatic contacts with other states. 
In terms of logistics, for a small country with limited resources to send diplomatic delegations to 
all of the countries of the world would be costly in terms of money and manpower.123 When one 
considers further that only nationals may serve as diplomats and that nationals often make a 
plurality or minority in the microstates, this becomes an even more arduous task. For these 
reasons, it is more practical to establish a diplomatic post at the headquarters of an international 
organization which serves as a locus where diplomats from nearly all the countries of the world 
congregate.124 
Conclusion 
The microstates have unique governmental systems and share some of their 
sovereignties with their neighbors, often due to limitations of capacity and in other cases 
due to intimidation and interference. Generally, the microstates are prosperous and 
though recently the world community has taken action against their controversial 
methods of raising revenue, they have consistently maintained a more than sufficient 
capacity to pay United Nations dues. Membership in international organizations is a top 
priority for the microstates as it reinforces their existence and efficiently expands their 
opportunities to interact with other states. 
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Though these are particular reasons, there is nothing about these states that by 
itself makes them ineligible for membership either by the Charter or by the International 
Court of Justice advisory ruling. The next chapters provide some contrast between the 
European microstates and shows that states with absolute and relative disqualifications 
which were accepted so long as the states were politically acceptable for the current 
United Nations members. 
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
E x a m i n i n g  P r e v i o u s  E x p l a n a t i o n s  
 The purpose of the first part of this thesis was to provide the reader with the necessary 
information before evaluating the arguments provided by previous authors and then my own. The 
purpose of the second part of this thesis will be to use that information as a foundation to dispute 
the explanations that have so far been proposed and then provide an original answer to the 
research question. This chapter accomplishes the first of the two aims. Here, I present arguments 
that have been made by scholars that have studied the microstates and their relations with the 
United Nations. Considering this is the first scholarly work exclusively dedicated to the 
interactions between the microstates and the United Nations since they gained admission, I have 
the luxury which the other authors did not of greater historical perspective and seeing what 
transpired to finally gain the microstates their admission. Using the information presented in the 
first part of the thesis, I show that the previous explanations do not accurately explain the 
microstates’ absence from the United Nations. This chapter is crucial in setting up the final 
chapters in which I explain the political climate in the General Assembly and how the political 
positions of the microstates made them perpetually undesirable to the powers that controlled the 
United Nations. 
 Previous assessments of why the microstates failed to gain entry to the United Nations 
centered on their peculiar aspects: their deputed sovereignties, their small size, a perceived 
incapacity to fulfill charter obligations or a lack of willingness. This section examines each of 
these null hypotheses beginning with where their foundations in previous writings and the public 
realm. I refute each hypothesis with evidence of other states that were admitted decades in 
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advance of the microstate in contradiction of the arguments presented. To remind the reader, the 
hypotheses that I am setting out to disprove are: 
HO-A: The European microstates had deputed too many of their sovereignties to be 
members of the United Nations 
HO-B – The European microstates were too small in terms of geographic area and 
population to be members of the United Nations 
HO-C – The European microstates did not wish to become members 
 
HO-D – The European microstates were not capable of fulfilling United Nations Charter 
obligations. 
The chapter will follow this order. As I eliminate these hypotheses, I clear way for my own 
hypothesis, in short, that the existing member-states created barriers to the European microstates 
based purely on political reasons. 
HO-A: The European microstates had deputed too many of their sovereignties to be 
members of the United Nations 
 Given the sovereign powers that the microstates have ceded to their sister states, many 
believe that the European microstates did not possess a sufficient amount of sovereignty to be 
members of the United Nations. In this regard, a state might be too susceptible to coercion or 
control from another state which would dictate its position on certain issues. Other states may 
fear that based on sovereign equality, coercive states would effectively control puppet votes to 
build disproportionate support for a resolution. The legal basis for this rejection relates back to 
the requirement in Article 4, Section 1 of the Charter that membership is open to states, with 
sovereignty being a requirement for statehood. 
Establ ishing the hypothes is 
Many academic perspectives support the hypothesis that the European microstates were 
not sufficiently sovereign for membership. The microstates’ requirements to follow their larger 
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neighbors on economic issues, some argued, would not allow them to independently enforce 
sanctions against those states.125 Others take the stated justification of Liechtenstein’s rejection 
from the League of Nations at face value, that the she was not sufficiently sovereign and reflect it 
in their writing.126 In the particular case of Andorra, scholars point to her inability to form her 
own foreign affairs ministry until 1993 as a barrier to its membership.127 
If the popular newsmagazine Time is any reflection of the conventional wisdom, its 1965 
Guide to the United Nations, demonstrates the prevalence of the sovereignty argument against 
the microstates: “Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino are not eligible (for 
membership) being principalities rather than sovereign states.”128 This quote from such an 
authoritative source that is so influential in guiding the opinion of not only the public, but also of 
decision makers, shows the ubiquity of misinformation and assumptions made about the 
microstates. 
Let us now examine circumstances in which political actors refused the entry of the 
microstates to international politics based on their limited sovereignties. This comes in the form 
of historical attempts of the microstates to join international organizations that were opposed on 
the basis of their limited sovereignties. First, I discuss the League of Nation’s refusal of 
Liechtenstein’s application in 1920, then the Soviet Union’s opposition to Liechtenstein’s 
membership to the International Court of Justice in 1949. 
Following World War I, Liechtenstein wished to assert itself on the global stage in a 
“campaign for international recognition.”129 This included an attempt to attend the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 that gained it recognition by the powers attending, though not a seat at the 
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table.130 On behalf of Liechtenstein, Switzerland submitted the Principality’s application for 
membership to the League in July 1920.131 The League voted against Liechtenstein’s proposed 
membership by a margin of 28 to 1, with 13 abstentions.132 In its reasoning, the League stated: 
There can be no doubt that juridically the Principality of Liechtenstein is a sovereign State, but by 
reason of her very limited area, small population and her geographical position, she had chosen to 
depute to others some of the attributes of sovereignty. For instance, she has contracted with other 
Powers for the control of her Customs, the administration of her Posts, Telegraphs and Telephone 
Services, for the diplomatic representation of her subjects in foreign countries, other than 
Switzerland and Austria, and for final decisions in certain judicial cases. Liechtenstein has no 
army.133 
 
This rejection touches on many possible justifications for Liechtenstein’s disqualification but 
centers ultimately on her deputed sovereignties. Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Edvard 
Benes isolates the priority placed on sovereignty over size: 
The reason given for the non-admission of the latter [Liechtenstein] is not, however, its small 
size, but its close connection with another State. . . . One may deduce from the decision taken 
with regard to these [mini-] States that, in practice, the smallness of a State does not prevent its 
being admitted into the League.134 
 
Gunter goes on to argue, as I shall below, that the admissions of other members with limited 
sovereignties were tolerated, so sovereignty by itself cannot be the reason Liechtenstein’s 
application was rejected. Unfortunately for Liechtenstein, this rejection established a precedent, 
making the Principality reluctant to apply again for membership in international organizations 
for a long time thereafter. The rejection also established as precedent an exaggerated 
understatement of Liechtenstein’s relative sovereignty as certain facts in the statement were 
incorrect (e.g. aspects of postal administatration and customs control). 
The Soviet Union and Ukraine opposed Liechtenstein and San Marino’s applications to 
the International Court of Justice in 1949 and 1953, respectively, following this precedent that 
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the microstates were not sufficiently sovereign.135 This most hypocritical of objections was not 
sustained and the USSR and Ukraine abstained from voting on the eventually successful 
applications of the two microstates. Beginning with this aforementioned example, let us now 
look states that were granted membership in the United Nations despite having sovereignties that 
were just as limited as the European microstates. 
Why the hypothes is  i s  wrong  
Despite the global community’s stated aversion to states that are not fully sovereign, 
contradictions arise in the cases of Ukraine, Belarus, India, the Philippines and Luxembourg’s 
memberships to the United Nations as original signatories of the San Francisco Treaty. These 
cases represent exceptions to the one-country, one-vote policy of sovereign equality and 
demonstrate that the United Nation’s exclusion of microstates by their limited sovereignties is a 
poor and inconsistent excuse. 
The inclusion of Ukraine and Belarus came upon the instance of Soviet leader Joseph 
Stalin during the Yalta Conference. This proposal was supported by Prime Minister Churchill 
who empathized with the devastation endured by the two Soviet Republics during the Second 
World War. The United Kingdom also wanted to ensure that members of the Commonwealth 
would gain membership and looked at the admissions of Belarus and Ukraine as a 
compromise.136 US President Franklin Roosevelt did not want to outright oppose his two 
counterparts given the delicate nature of the Yalta talks and instead of directly confronting the 
issue, he reasserted the concept of sovereign equality and his wish to see it instituted. US 
Secretary of State, James Byrnes vehemently opposed the proposal and reminded the President 
of a previous promise he made to a group of US Senators that should the Soviet Union gain 
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multiple votes, he would retort by demanding votes for all 48 US States. The United States 
ultimately relented and allowed Belarus and Ukraine their votes with no compensation to the US, 
acknowledging that this was a violation of the concept of sovereign equality as “the Soviet 
republics are no more independent than the states of our Union.”137 
A reworking of the Soviet Constitution in 1944 permitted Union Republics to establish 
their own Commissariats of Foreign Affairs which Stalin argued would provide for independent 
foreign policies of Ukraine and Belarus, though in practice there was hardly ever any 
differentiation between the Union Republics’ voting and the Soviet Union’s. The Coincidence 
Index of the two sub-states to the Soviet Union’s votes in the General Assembly demonstrate 
nearly perfect coincidence for every five year period from the inception of the United Nations 
until 1980.138 Belarus and Ukraine recorded a CI of 992 with each other, one of the highest in 
United Nations history.139 The cases of Ukraine and Belarus invalidate the principle of sovereign 
equality as the Soviet Union clearly had three votes for one state. 
The cases of commonwealth possessions India and the Philippines also show that full 
sovereignty was not necessary for certain entities to achieve member-state status. In fact, British 
India was a comprehensive member of the League of Nations. However, this may be explained 
as the League of Nations Covenant made membership eligible to “any fully self-governing State, 
Dominion or Colony” with India specifically in mind.140 The United Nations Charter, however, 
was stricter in definition and refers merely to “states.”141 As India and the Philippines were not 
independent states until 1947 and 1946 respectively, their inclusion as original members of the 
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United Nations in 1945 is anomalous.142 In practice, in the League of Nations, despite some 
independence on minor issues, India’s votes reflected British foreign policy rather than the 
Indian public’s will.143 India only began asserting its own foreign policy in September 1946 
when Indians were allowed to assume power.144 Some scholars interpret the inclusions of India 
and the Philippines as unique cases due to India’s long history in international affairs and the 
Philippines’ important role in World War II.145 However, these cases demonstrate the 
inconsistency of sovereign statehood as a requirement for membership and discredit those who 
argue that it can entirely explain the microstates’ exclusion. 
Lastly, Luxembourg provides perhaps the most glaring contradiction in that it has many 
restrictions on its sovereignty similar to those of the smaller microstates. Luxembourg is vastly 
different from Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino as it is quite large in comparison 
and was an original member not only of the United Nations but also the European Union.146 Her 
size makes Luxembourg capable of maintaining large agricultural and industrial sectors in her 
economy which the microstates do not have. Her size and geographic position, much to her 
chagrin, have also placed her between the great powers of France and Germany and the lesser 
power of Belgium, turning Luxembourg into a battlefield during both World Wars. The Grand 
Duchy, however, is similar to the microstates in that, prior to European integration, it formed a 
customs union with Belgium and the Netherlands dating back to 1921.147 Additionally, the 
conduct of consular representation in third states where, because of Luxembourg’s limited 
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resources, it has no representation, has been handled by the Netherlands since 1880.148 Verzijl, in 
fact, uses Luxembourg and Liechtenstein as parallel examples of consequences of voluntary 
agreements.149 The similarities between Luxembourg and the other microstates, though 
especially Liechtenstein, demonstrate a double standard when discussing sovereignty. It seems 
that though Luxembourg had quite comparable sovereign attributes with respect to Liechtenstein, 
it received preferential treatment in its admission to international organizations. We might guess 
that its larger area and geographic position between Europe’s feuding powers of the 20th Century 
necessitated its membership to the League, setting a precedent for its future inclusion in other 
international organizations.150 
Conclusion 
Eventually, when the European microstates did gain admission, many of the same 
restrictions on their sovereignties still existed. Most notably, Monaco was still bound to perfect 
conformity with French foreign policy until the treaty revision of 2002. This extended to votes in 
the General Assembly for which Monaco’s delegation had to confer with French diplomats to 
receive instructions on how to vote.151 Sovereignty could not have been a barrier to admission if, 
when finally admitted, Monaco was not sovereign but instead a second vote for France. 
Clearly, there are and there should remain lower limits beneath which entities lack 
enough sovereignty to be considered responsible for representing their own beliefs in the United 
Nations. British, American and French overseas territories come to mind in this context. Seeing 
that today’s lower thresholds for size in terms of population and geographic area have been 
lowered by the admissions of the European microstates, it is hard to rule out entities like 
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Gibraltar, Guam or French Polynesia simply on merits of size. Rather, these entities must be 
understood to be excluded because they are globally recognized as components of larger states. 
These examples are different from the European microstates prior to their admissions to the 
United Nations as the microstates were universally recognized, sovereign states. The examples 
cited in this paragraph, however, do not currently possess the sovereign powers that the 
European microstates did neither de jure nor de facto. 
The cases of Ukraine, Belarus, India, the Philippines and Luxembourg lead me to a 
reasoned rejection that the limited sovereignties of the European microstates prevented them 
from being able to join the United Nations. While there is no doubt that each of the microstates 
had agreed to depute certain sovereign powers to its larger neighbors, there is equally no doubt 
that other entities with similarly deputed powers were received as members of the United 
Nations. Even the least sovereign of the microstates, Andorra, enjoyed just as much sovereignty 
as Belarus and Ukraine, if not more. India and the Philippines, also not independent at the time 
of their admission, also show the lax applicability of the criterion of sovereignty. Luxembourg 
had a sovereign status quite similar to that of the smaller European countries, proving that this 
level of sovereignty was acceptable to the United Nations. In sum, sovereignty could not have 
been a barrier to membership for the microstates as it was not one for other states. 
 
HO-B – The European microstates were too small in terms of geographic area and population to be 
members of the United Nations 
 The second existing hypothesis is that the European microstates, by reason of their 
diminutive size and limited population were not admissible. In any assessment of these countries, 
it is difficult to ignore the small size of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino and the 
role that both their limited geographic land masses and small populations played in their 
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exclusion from the United Nations. The microstates’ small sizes are even implicit in the moniker 
“microstate.” Some authors use terms like exiguous, diminutive and Lilliputian, all emphasizing 
size as these states’ defining characteristic. Many states believed that to extend membership to 
these states would be unreasonable and unfair to the larger states. Yet as the aforementioned 
1948 advisory ruling of the International Court of Justice stated, a state’s candidature may only 
be considered based on the five listed criteria, of which size is not one. Thus, existing member-
states had no legal basis for excluding the microstates based on their diminutive sizes. Though 
noble in principle, this never stopped critics and politicians from invoking size as a justification 
for the non-inclusion of the European microstates. 
Historical precedent in the League of Nations shows that smallness, at the time, was a 
deeper justification than insufficient sovereignty for rejecting Liechtenstein and forcing San 
Marino and Monaco to withdraw their applications. Statements made in and actions taken by the 
United Nations demonstrate that the microstates’ small size in terms of both geography and 
population continued to pose an obstacle to their admission. Employing academic and historical 
arguments, I demonstrate that though standards of size have been invoked as justification, these 
standards have been arbitrary and inconsistent. 
Establ ishing the hypothes is 
Academic opinions support this claim as it seems to have been the most dominant 
explanation for the microstates’ exclusion for quite some time. Duursma believes that fears 
during the decolonization process that there would be an inundation of small states were 
exaggerated and once discovered to be unfounded allowed the European microstates to join and 
points out that a recurring trend has been the unwillingness of larger countries to give a 
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disproportionate amount of power to small countries.152 In analyzing Liechtenstein’s rejection 
from the League of Nations in 1920, Gunter does not trust the justification on record and 
believes instead that it was Liechtenstein’s small size that caused its exclusion.153 Raton, another 
scholar on Liechtenstein concurs. Between these two authors we see quite easily that 
Liechtenstein’s rejection from the League created a precedent placing size at the forefront of how 
other states perceived the microstates. 
In tables, graphs and reports, especially from the 1960’s, there is a tendency toward 
hyperbole to overstate the extent to which membership may be extended. This created the 
impression that allowing the European microstates to join would be a step along a slippery slope 
that one day might lead to membership for entities like Pitcairn Island whose population is 
beneath 100. These fears ultimately were overblown and many of the potential states that reports 
listed never gained or desired independence. 
This easily is one of the favored opinions of conventional wisdom as size is the most 
defining trait of the European microstates, most obvious to even those who are not aware of the 
powers that the microstates have deputed to their larger neighbors, their lack of militarized forces 
or perceived unwillingness to join the United Nations. Many states, especially those with limited 
foreign affairs ministries, focus the better part of their foreign affairs budget on investigating the 
larger, more obviously potent states of the world with which they will need to interact on a more 
recurring basis. In such a case, these states are forced rely on their first impressions of the 
microstates and generalize that their small size is sufficient explanation for their exclusion. 
When Liechtenstein was rejected from the League of Nations in 1920, the formal 
reasoning was that its deputed sovereignties made it incapable of all the obligations imposed by 
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the Covenant.154 However other diplomats present cited the smallness of the Principality. Though 
Czechoslovakian diplomat Edvard Benes attributed the rejection of Liechtenstein solely to its 
deputed sovereignties, it is worth mentioning that Czechoslovakia had a recent dispute with 
Liechtenstein over the refusal of the Prince to pay new taxes on property he owned in Slovakia 
though what impact this might have on Benes’ statements is merely conjecture.155 The French 
representative on the Sub-Committee considering Liechtenstein’s admission did not think it 
would be proper for such a small state to have the same voting weight as a large state.156 Even 
Liechtenstein’s lone advocate Switzerland conceded that, “Liechtenstein is too small a state to be 
able to be admitted in the current conditions.”157 Mendelson believes that the Viviani 
Questionnaire, the survey designed to discern information from all applicants, asked questions 
about the size and population specifically to exclude states that it deemed too small.158 
 It is important to place this rejection within proper context. The League of Nations 
wanted to create an everlasting peace in Europe and wanted to maintain an aura of prestige and 
seriousness. Accordingly, the admission of small states with little recognition at a time when the 
League did not include such important states as Germany, Mexico and the Soviet Union would 
seem to undermine the legitimacy and grandeur of the League. The small size of the microstates 
also posed procedural questions. Sovereign equality gave each member of the League an equal 
voice. The League of Nations operated on unanimity on most issues and allowing a country of 
10,000 inhabitants a veto over a world of 2 billion is quite reasonably objectionable. 
Disproving the hypothesis  
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 As the international system evolved, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, 
moved away from a system of unanimity and created the conditions for small states to be 
accepted. This allowed the Organization to be more productive than its predecessor and 
mitigated the disproportionate power that smaller states could have. Seemingly, the objections 
over size would disappear. In practice, small states became more acceptable to the specialized 
agencies in the post-war period. Liechtenstein applied to become party to the International Court 
of Justice in 1949. In its evaluation of Liechtenstein’s candidature, the Soviet Union and Ukraine 
raised objections on the grounds that Liechtenstein was not, in their perception, a sovereign 
state.159 Despite their misgivings, USSR and Ukraine rejected the concept of smallness for 
exclusion: 
The position of the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR is that, from the point of view of 
principle, we have always taken the stand that a State, however small, has the same rights 
as a large State in the matter of joining the United Nations or becoming a Party to 'the 
Statute of the International  Court.’ The question of whether a given State has a large 
territory or a small one, of whether it has a considerable population or not, is of no 
consequence to us.160 
  
From the earliest days of the United Nations, membership included states that were 
drastically smaller than the rest. The minimum in terms of geography was Luxembourg which 
covers 2,586 km2.161 As new small states emerged due to the decolonization process and other 
factors and were admitted to the United Nations without protest, the lower threshold was set 
progressively lower. Malta became independent in 1964 and was admitted to the United Nations 
despite its size of 316 km2. Singapore, despite its geographic small size of 697 km2, was 
admitted the same year as its independence in 1965. In the same session, the Maldives with an 
area of 298 km2 was admitted. The parade of small states continued with Barbados at 430 km2 in 
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1966, Grenada at 344 km2 in 1974 and the Seychelles at 455 km2 in 1976. The question of land 
area becomes increasingly dubious as by 1965 the Maldives, smaller in area than Andorra’s 468 
km2 and less than twice as large as Liechtenstein’s 160 km2, had been admitted. Any threshold 
for size should have included the European microstates by the point in time. 
In the early days of the United Nations, the state with the smallest population was Iceland 
with a mere 122,000 inhabitants at its date of accession.162 The Maldives entered the United 
Nations in 1965 with a population of only 40,000.163 Rapoport questions then how any country 
with fewer inhabitants can be excluded. Comparing the largest state in the United Nations and 
this new member, he points out that there were 4,928 Indians for every one Maldivian.164 It 
seems with the Maldives any reasonable argument of a minimum size had crossed a point of no 
return. The admissions of the European microstates would not have made for a much more 
heinous ratio. 
Conclusion  
 As we can see, states of similar proportions in terms of geography and population had 
long been members of the United Nations before the European microstates were admitted. 
Existing members could no longer argue against the admissions of Andorra, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco and San Marino on these grounds without being hypocritical of past decisions they had 
made. With the progression of time, the size threshold lowered, but had well surpassed the 
European microstates before their admission. For these reasons we may reject the hypothesis of 
small size as a disqualification for membership. 
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HO-C – The European microstates did not wish to become members 
 The simplest explanation of the microstates’ absence from the United Nations might be 
attributed to a lack of willingness on the part of the microstates. After all, unlike the League of 
Nations, the United Nations has never invited countries to join; states instead must apply in order 
to be considered for membership.165 This requirement for membership is outlined in Article 4, 
Section 1 in two parts: the third criterion of acceptance of Charter obligations and the fifth 
criterion of willingness to carry them out. In practice, a state must submit a statement, usually a 
piece of legislation by that state’s national assembly or decree by its monarch, declaring its 
acceptance as part of its application for membership. 
The European microstates never once submitted an application for membership and an 
observer might see this as the most logical explanation for why they did not become members. 
However, to imply that a lack of willingness or desire on the part of the microstates can explain 
their non-application would be an incorrect assumption. We can recall their reasons for wanting 
to join international organizations: the legitimacy that membership confers them and the efficient 
extension of diplomatic contacts that an international organization’s headquarters provides. 
Membership in the United Nations has long been the highest goal of each state. Membership, to 
them, is an irrevocable credential and affirmation of their existence. 166 By extension, to not try to 
join the United Nations is tantamount to admitting that the state does not exist. 
Of course, the microstates did officially try once, for the League of Nations. Following 
Liechtenstein’s rejection, Monaco withdrew its application and San Marino let its application 
lapse. Monaco and San Marino, I would infer, saw the precedent set by the refusal of 
Liechtenstein and did not want to face the same humiliation. The fear of a further rejection led 
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the countries to be reticent in approaching the United Nations, as it seemed safer to wait for a 
window of opportunity than be rejected and push back their chances for another few decades. 
As such, when sensing opportunity, the microstates dispatched diplomats, either 
individually or through observer missions to the United Nations to gauge reaction and sense 
when the moment was right. Monaco opened a permanent observer mission to the United 
Nations in 1956 as a way of keeping its finger on the pulse of the Organization.167 Liechtenstein 
engaged in quiet diplomatic outreach, dispatching emissaries to meet with diplomats for Security 
Council members in New York in the 1960’s and were dissuaded from applying but sent 
diplomats again in 1988 and were given encouragement to apply.168 To enhance its chances of 
admission, Liechtenstein even engaged in a measure of cultural diplomacy when Prince Hans-
Adam II loaned his personal art collection for an exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum in New 
York in 1985 designed at raising awareness of the small country in the world’s capital.169 
The entry of Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino into the United Nations Specialized 
Agencies beginning in the late 1940’s can also be seen as intent and desire to take part in 
comprehensive membership. One scholar views the specialized agencies as part of a larger 
mission to eventually join the top echelon: 
Monaco considered its admission to institutions linked to the United Nations as a 
trampoline which would permit it one day to become a full member of the United 
Nations; it is why the micro-state, always in search of international recognition, showed a 
systematic want to participate in institutions linked to the U.N.170 
 
This trampoline strategy shows a great deal of forethought on the part of the microstates. Their 
participation in the Specialized Agencies served both to advance their campaigns for recognition 
but ultimately as stepping stones toward the grand prize, the United Nations. 
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Lofty or unrealistic goals have never stood in the way of the microstates’ ambitions. 
Andorra-la-Vella bid for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games and finished dead last in the seven-
way competition. Andorra, Monaco and San Marino are all members of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization despite not having an airport. Endeavors like this are not designed to 
succeed or serve a great purpose, but rather draw attention to the country and are well worth the 
expensive entry fees that they entail. One author characterized the accession of Monaco, not as a 
sudden and new desire, but instead he says, “The admission in 1993 bestows the constant will of 
Monaco’s Princes… to promote all the initiatives tending to bring nations together to prevent 
conflicts.”171 
In conclusion, to say that no formal application evidences a lack of desire is too simplistic 
an explanation. Clearly, the microstates were fighting for attention, but after repeated brush offs 
the microstates were reticent to put themselves out on a limb and get rejected. Their desire was 
always present yet their ability to transform this willingness into actual membership depended on 
the political climate in the General Assembly, as I will show in Chapters Four and Five. 
HO-D – The European microstates were not capable of fulfilling United Nations Charter obligations. 
 Another argument employed against the admission of the European microstates was that 
they were not able to sufficiently fulfill the requirements, financially and toward the maintenance 
of global security, put forth in the United Nations Charter. This basis for exclusion is in the 
fourth criterion for membership from Article 4, Section 1, the capacity to fulfill Charter 
obligations, in the judgment of the United Nations.172 The two most notable obligations for 
which the most objections have been raised to the microstates are Articles 17 and 43 which detail 
the financial and security obligations that member-states are required to uphold, respectively. 
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This section will deal first the context of those who voiced their opinion against the capacity of 
microstates and then with financial obligations and then obligations to maintaining world peace 
and security. 
Context 
 When the subject of the microstates arose again in the 1960’s, it was deeply intertwined 
with the global movement toward decolonization. As many new small states emerged from their 
previous colonial rulers, the United Nations was faced with the question of whether or not to 
include them. Under Secretary-General U Thant, the United Nations became reluctant to admit 
many of these states, fearing a deluge of new members. To justify this opposition, the Secretary-
General asserted that these states would be unable to fulfill the duties of membership.173 Chief 
among these obligations were the financial assessments demanded under Article 17 and the 
contributions to collective security in Article 43. Though the ultimate resolution of the 1960’s 
microstates debate was that microstates are incapable of fulfilling these obligations, this 
argument did not accurately assess the European microstates’ capacity and instead characterized 
them off assumptions of microstates from elsewhere. This period had a certain confusion 
between the European microstates and the ex-colonial microstates and when criticisms of one 
group were presented, they seemingly applied to both. Many authors backed up this opinion 
without questioning it, that the microstates did not have the means to fulfill financial 
obligations.174 
Financial  Obl igat ions 
 All member-states of the United Nations are required to contribute to the Organization’s 
annual budget as put forth in Article 17 of the Charter: 
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1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization. 
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the 
General Assembly. 
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary 
arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the 
administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making 
recommendations to the agencies concerned.175 
Each year an assessment scale is negotiated between members of the General Assembly to be 
paid both by members and non-members who are part of the Specialized Agencies. A minimum 
amount may be paid by the least capable members, usually no less than 0.04% of the total 
budget. For states that join during a plenary session, an assessment is prorated. By Article 19, 
failure to pay contributions leads to a member-state losing its vote though this has never been 
enforced.176 
Why the hypothesis is wrong 
Financial capacity, though as I have demonstrated above was not an insurmountable 
obstacle for the European microstates, would be a sufficient criterion for excluding certain states 
were it to have ever been practiced. The inclusion of several member-states with financial 
difficulties shows that it never was. The cases of the Gambia, the Maldives and newly 
independent island countries show that certain member states with large financial liabilities were 
tolerable to the United Nations though the financially capable European microstates were not. 
The Gambia, a small African country which was admitted to the United Nations in 1965, 
the same year that it gained its independence from the United Kingdom, addressed its financial 
difficulties to the plenary session on its first day as a member-state. D.K. Jawara, the Prime 
Minister of the Gambia, said in his address, “The Gambia finds that it is expected to contribute to 
the expenses of the United Nations on the basis of a minimum contribution which is out of 
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proportion to its resources.”177 Throughout its first few years, the Gambia did not even maintain 
a permanent delegation in New York.178 
The Maldives, a former colony of the United Kingdom, was also admitted to the United 
Nations in 1965 shortly following its independence. Despite reservations on the part of the 
United States’ representative to the Security Council on the grounds of the Maldives’ financial 
capacity, the Security Council unanimously supported the Maldives’ application.179 In turn, this 
would lead to problems for the archipelago state in the long run as it found it expensive to even 
send its delegation to New York for plenary sessions, missing the entire 1971 session.180 
Many other island and African states’ revenues were well below any realistic measure of 
sufficient wealth to handle United Nations obligations. During the 1960’s while all United 
Nations members of that time had revenues of at least $15 million, 75% of the island and 
emerging African and Asian entities had revenues of less than $15 million.181 Though many 
argue that the European microstates were not fit for membership and could not afford the 
financial obligations, United Nations practice in the admission of African and island countries 
without the means to contribute disprove this claim. One may reasonably ask then why these 
newly independent countries were admitted if their incapacity was so evident. This should have 
been an especially heightened concerned following the lack of funds that paralyzed the United 
Nations and forced it to remove nearly the entire agenda from its plenary session of 1964.182 
The political climate at the time of decolonization was that of revulsion and contempt 
toward former colonizers and support for any goodwill for the newly independent countries. One 
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author states, “Opposition to their admission would be equated by some members with a 
procolonialist stand. The willingness of the United Nations to admit [African] ministates goes 
hand in hand with one of the principal values of the present international system, the dismantling 
of the colonial system.”183 This eagerness to appear supportive of the victims of colonization 
overrode any attention to the economic viability of the new countries. Therefore if economic 
capacity of potential member-states was not assessed, it could not have truly proved a barrier to 
the European microstates’ admission. Even if it were, it is clear that the European microstates 
would have surpassed the low standards of financial capacity set by United Nations practice. 
 The wise option for these small impoverished states may have been the path that Western 
Samoa, Nauru and Tonga took toward membership; deferring membership because of their 
financial incapacity despite Assembly resolutions encouraging them to join.184 
Aside from academic conjecture, in practice questions were raised to the microstates’ 
capacity to handle financial obligations. Secretary-General U Thant was among the harshest 
critics of proposed membership stating that, “Such membership may, on the one hand, impose 
obligations which are too onerous for the ‘Micro-States.’”185 The Secretary-General assigned a 
Committee of Experts to investigate the matter further. The United States and the United 
Kingdom offered two alternative proposals to allow categories of non-full membership. The 
United States devised a category of “Associated Membership” by which states would “enjoy the 
rights of a Member… except to vote or hold office” and “bear the obligations of a Member 
except the obligations to pay financial assessments.”186 The British plan was for a similarly 
limited participation by which states “voluntarily renounce certain rights” and make a nominal 
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financial contribution.187 These proposals single out a financial inability as the sole obligation 
that microstates were seemingly unprepared to fulfill, underlining its supremacy in the faults that 
United Nations members found with these countries. Eventually neither of these plans was 
adopted as doing so would require amendments to the Charter, undesirable as Cold War 
adversaries or the Non-Aligned Movement may seek to manipulate other provisions in the 
Charter. 
The consequence of these proposals is that the European microstates were seen not only 
to be too poor, but apparently incapable of fulfilling other obligations. These criticisms aimed 
chiefly at postcolonial states, remained with the European microstates even well after the 
African, Asian and island microstates were admitted. These associate membership proposals 
were futile attempt on the part of the Northern powers to stop the flow of ex-colonial states into 
the United Nations that had collateral effects on the European microstates. 
Obligations to maintain g lobal  se curi ty 
As the microstates maintain no militaries but rather share power for their defense with 
their sister states, many authors believe that they may not fulfill the obligations laid out in the 
Charter to maintain global peace and security.188 They consider the obligations toward 
maintaining international peace and security to be the most fundamental of any obligation put 
forth in the Charter.189 Chapter VII of the Charter on “Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” contains these obligations. The duties of 
a member-state in the case of United Nations response to a disruption of the peace are outlined in 
Article 43: 
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1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in 
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security. 
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of 
readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the 
Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or 
between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the 
signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.190 
During the San Francisco Conference, neutrality was explicitly discussed and ruled a 
disqualification for any potential member.191 It was for this explicit reason that Switzerland 
ceased consideration of joining the United Nations and that public opinion and government 
foreign policy in Switzerland turned sharply against accession to the United Nations.192 As such, 
all original members of the United Nations were countries with standing armies that all declared 
war against the Axis during World War II. While it is clear, as has been described in the chapter 
of this book devoted to sovereignty, that none of the microstates maintain any armed forces, 
certain neutral states’ admissions to the United Nations demonstrate that Article 43 is not strictly 
enforced and that exceptions can be made. 
The critique against the microstates’ incapacity in respect to military obligations was 
embedded in the League’s refusal of Liechtenstein. One sentence is particularly curt and sharp: 
“Liechtenstein has no army.” The precedent from the League decision certainly affixed the lack 
of militarized forces in the mindset of decision makers on the admissibility of Liechtenstein. But 
other nations lacked armies or refused to take part in other actions in order to maintain global 
peace and security. Aside from Article 43, there is the requirement in Article 41 that requires 
states to take part in any punitive action (including economic sanctions) when it has been ordered 
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by the Security Council. The following cases of Iceland, Japan and Austria show that exceptions 
could be made for certain states who did not have the capacity or willingness to fulfill these 
requirements. 
Ice land 
Iceland applied for United Nations membership in 1946 despite not having an army. 
During World War II, American troops operated an airbase on the island but there was much 
domestic opposition to a long term continued presence of American military on Iceland193 which 
spoke to an ingrained neutrality and opposition to war. Despite her aid to the Allies, Iceland 
never formally declared war on Germany.194 Gröndal illustrates this point: 
“Iceland was an ‘unarmed’ nation and had no military forces of any kind. This was one of the 
most deeply rooted traditions of the nation and had shaped the outlook of every Icelander. The 
idea that they could declare war was completely alien to them.”195 
 
Consequently, there was a deep discomfort with the airbase’s continued use, be it by the United 
States or the United Nations. In order to achieve its objective without obliging the use of the 
airbase, Iceland communicated with the major powers to allow it to invoke clause (3) of Article 
43 and maintain a check over unrestrained United Nations use of the airbase.196 Here, Iceland 
exemplifies that a member-state may participate in maintaining security without providing arms 
or armed forces. Similarly, no United Nations member objected to retaining Costa Rica as a 
member after it willfully demilitarized itself in 1949. 
Japan  
 Following the atrocities it suffered during the Second World War, Japan officially 
renounced the right to war and abolished its armaments in its new constitution.197 However as 
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East Asia became a volatile region of the world in the late 1940’s with wars in nearby China and 
Korea, Japan began to fret for its security. To ensure its safety, many Japanese looked toward the 
United Nations as a solution. Yet this was problematic for Japan as the neutrality it desired 
conflicted with the requirements of enforcement action in Article 43. Japan viewed this seeming 
dilemma by separating enforcement from military action and decided that it could willingly 
participate in enforcement action by offering facilities and other forms of assistance but drew the 
line at contributing military forces and possessing armaments.198 
Austr ia  
At the same time that Japan was considering membership, Austria was as well. There was 
no opposition to her neutrality upon her admission, in fact it was essentially a condition.199 
Though Austria willfully took part in the obligations toward military security enforcement, a 
point of which the state is quite proud, Austria was reluctant to take part in economic sanctions. 
In 1968, Austria refused to participate in sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, the only country 
to do so in the United Nations.200 Here, we see a full member-state lacking not just the capacity 
but also the will to carry out Charter obligations. 
Conclusion 
 If certain states failed to meet the requirement of capacity, we may legitimately question 
why they were still accepted. The financially incapable ones shared a certain character, they were 
former colonies and did not have well-developed economies or governmental structures at the 
time of their independence and admission to the United Nations. These countries had the benefit 
of similar attitudes on the issues of decolonization, human rights and Southwestern Africa with 
the Non-Aligned Movement which ruled the United Nations from 1960-1989. I go into greater 
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detail about this in Chapter Five, but I believe that this political favoritism meant that the NAM 
bent the rules for countries with a similar political mentality. For these countries, incapacity was 
not a limit to their admission. 
Iceland was a strong ally of the United States, as was Japan. As early as the Yalta 
Conference, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill pushed for the inclusion of 
Iceland.201 However her reluctance to declare war on Germany due to its neutrality forced it to 
wait until 1946 to attain membership. Iceland’s connection to the West is further evidenced by its 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty. Japan, whose constitution the United States had a great 
part in writing, was an American ally. The United States, responsible for rebuilding Japan, left a 
lasting impression on Japanese foreign policy, the scope of which is beyond this paper; it suffices 
to say that Japan was a western-minded state in the United Nations. 
Austria, a neutral and centrist state, is a much more particular case. It not only was 
neutral but maintained its distance from NATO like Finland and Ireland, two other countries 
with which it entered the United Nations in 1955. There is not just a military but also a political 
aspect to these cases. As these cases have greater implications to the hypothesis I present in 
Chapter Four, I simply say now that these countries’ abilities to persist in fighting for their entry 
to the United Nations differentiated them from the microstates. Nonetheless, Austria had the 
limited capacity which was given as justification against the entries of the European microstates 
and she is evidence that the claim that incapacity to fulfill obligations was not a prohibition to 
membership. 
 In sum, the concept of neutrality in the United Nations, though important and an obstacle 
to admission for certain member-states in the early days of the United Nations, was no longer 
seen as conflicting with the obligations of Article 43 by the 1950’s when Austria and Japan were 
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admitted and a limited ability to contribute to security enforcement measures did not prevent 
Iceland from becoming a member in 1946. For these reasons, the European microstates’ limited 
ability to contribute to security enforcement obligations or their neutrality cannot explain their 
exclusion from the United Nations. 
 Any argument that the European microstates could not satisfy any of the Charter 
obligations for membership, when judged against the existing members is lacking and incorrect. 
As shown here, none of the existing explanations for the exclusion of the European microstates 
up until this point are justifiable. The European microstates were no less sovereign than members 
Ukraine, Belarus, India, the Philippines or Luxembourg, no smaller than the Maldives, Barbados, 
Grenada and the Seychelles, no less wealthy than the Gambia or the Maldives and no less 
capable of contributing to international security than Iceland, Japan or Austria. The research 
question requires a new explanation. In the remaining chapters, I use the voting patterns of the 
General Assembly to rationally explain where the microstates would have voted and the interests 
of the existing members of allowing the microstates to enter and vote as such. This will point me 
toward the conclusion that existing voting blocs created barriers to the membership of states with 
the political character of the European microstates. While other states could overcome this 
barrier, the microstates could not until the barriers fell in 1989 which I show in the remaining 
chapters. 
 
SNYDER | 75 
C h a p t e r  F o u r  
1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 0 :  T h e  C o l d  S h o u l d e r  o f  t h e  C o l d  W a r  
Now that I have disproven the former hypotheses, it is time for me to present my own. I 
believe that rather than being excluded for limited sovereignty, small size, lack of willingness or 
incapacity, the microstates were truly excluded for their potential to change the political balance 
in the General Assembly in ways of which the powerful voting blocs did not approve. In essence, 
the microstates would have held the power to sway votes against the liking of the regimes that 
ruled the General Assembly. Specifically for the period of 1945-1960 I hypothesize that: 
HA-A: In a bipolar system where neither side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to 
pass resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1945-1960), a new actor who is perceived 
to enter at the center will face opposition from the existing actors resulting in barriers to 
that state gaining membership. 
In the case of other states with greater diplomatic resources, it was possible to overcome this 
barrier. For the microstates, however this was not possible. 
In order to explain how political reasons placed insurmountable to membership barriers 
before the microstates in the first era of 1945-1960, this chapter endeavors to present first the 
context of the Cold War in the General Assembly. I follow this up with a conceptual argument 
based closely on the United Nations of that era and make sense of each group in the system’s 
motives in opposing hypothetical states that would occupy a space at the center of its bipolar 
spectrum. I back up this hypothetical argument with proof that such groups existed and that 
microstates in fact would have been centrists within this system. This section proves that the 
microstates’ exclusion from the United Nations during the first era in question was due to a 
centrist position within the contemporary political context. As I show, the barriers to the 
microstates’ membership had nothing to do with their size but their political centrism in the 
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context of the Cold War. While Austria and Finland, based on unique circumstances, could 
surmount these barriers, the microstates did not have that power and remained outside. 
The United Nations as a Cold War Battleground 
 In order to assert influence, the United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies 
attempted to pass resolutions on a variety of issues whose implications could result in the 
shaming or punishment of an adversary. During the most heated years of confrontation between 
East and West in the General Assembly, 1947-67, one researcher counts 330 resolutions linked 
to the Cold War.202 After the development and use of atomic warfare during World War II, 
disarmament became a key issue with either side attempting to limit the ability of its adversary to 
grow its nuclear arsenal.203 The further admission of members was another point of conflict 
between the poles as neither Western- nor Eastern-allied states gained membership until the 1955 
package deal.204 Issues of colonization provoked sharp differences as the Soviet Union sought to 
agitate the West and searched for new alliances with ex-colonial states.205 Some other examples 
of conflict included resolutions on the question over the legitimate representation of China, the 
acceptance of observer missions from North and South Korea, statements on the Greek Civil 
War, human rights in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Soviet intervention in the Chinese 
Civil War, the United States’ relations with Cuba and condemning the United States during the 
U-2 Crisis of 1960.206 The General Assembly passed resolutions even in domains typically 
reserved for Security Council (though they had no enforcement power and were simply 
expressing the opinion of the General Assembly), such as when the General Assembly passed 
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resolutions expressing disapproval over the Soviet vetoes over the applications for membership 
of West Germany, South Vietnam and Mauritania among others. 
A  c o n c e p t u a l  a p p r o a c h  
 Keeping in mind the rules in the General Assembly that a two-thirds requirement is 
necessary for any successful resolution and that each actor receives one vote, let us imagine a 
situation in which there exist two poles, each lacking the two-thirds necessary for passage of a 
resolution. Second, let us also imagine that there is a centrist group of actors between the two 
poles. In order to win the passage of a resolution it is necessary for the center to support one of 
the poles so that a two-thirds supermajority may be reached. 
 Each pole then develops methods for winning the support of the center. Though two-
thirds are necessary for the successful adoption of a resolution, only one third is necessary for its 
defeat. This means that the pole opposing a resolution must also lobby for votes from the center 
in order to ensure its blockage. Lobbying the center means the weakening of positions, as 
concessions from original or desired positions must be negotiated in order to receive the support 
of centrist voters. 
The center has its own prerogatives as well though they do not extend to introducing 
resolutions. In the common interest, the center wishes to soften the position of either side; were it 
partisan and were it to agree automatically with the proposals put forward by one pole, then it 
would not truly be the center. By softening either side’s proposals, it extracts gains in the sense 
that a proposal that previously favored one pole at the expense of the other pole is now more 
universally supported. The center plays the role of decisive kingmaker, providing the additional 
support necessary to either pole, but only on the terms of each individual member of the center. 
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A center voter may also be self-interested and have other interests such as the advancement of its 
own favored issues that are not controversial to the polarized Assembly at large. 
Interes ts in not  expanding membership  
 Let us now take this system and see how its participants would respond in the event of 
the addition of a new member that would act as a centrist. This enlargement of membership 
entails costs to all parties. The poles must now expend more in lobbying the center. This involves 
both the costs of practical lobbying and the further softening of positions. The wider membership 
means that more individual votes must be controlled in order to win passage of a resolution. 
Neither pole wishes to spend more human resources in order to enlist the support of more centrist 
voters, nor does it wish to soften its stance on an issue any further. Therefore, the poles would 
reject the admission of new members in the center. 
For each individual member of the center, the introduction of new centrist members 
weakens its own position. Each member of the center’s vote now becomes replaceable to either 
pole as one or more of the new members may take that former voter’s place in the winning 
coalition. Accordingly, as it has been replaced in the coalition, the centrist may no longer extract 
the concessions that it was once able to gain from compromise with whichever pole. If it is 
replaced then its demands will no longer be reflected in the final resolution and the positions will 
be softened on the conditions of the replacement centrist. Should that state have held out in the 
past to gain more concessions from either pole, it may no longer do so without fear that the pole 
will abandon that centrist targeted for supported in the interest of a new centrist. Simply put, the 
expansion of the center makes each individual member of the center less powerful and less 
important to either pole when lobbying for support for a resolution. Therefore, the existing center 
would not wish to add more centrists. 
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 How, then, might an outside potential voter gain access to this electorate? There must be 
an ambiguity in the perceived voting behavior of such a voter. If both poles believe that once 
admitted, that voter will vote in conformity with the pole and increase its voting share, making it 
closer to achieving either a two-thirds supermajority to pass a resolution or a one-third share to 
block resolutions of the other pole, then both sides will support its inclusion. The poles’ dislike 
of centrists does not entirely necessitate their absolute prohibition from entry. Elements like 
persistency, diplomatic trade-offs and the ability to publicize the state’s exclusion as being 
against the intent of the Charter gave centrists the opportunity to overcome opposition. 
Putting the concept into practice : The General Assembly of 1945-1960 
The poles  
In the early years of the General Assembly, no clear majority emerged among member 
states.207 Many states voted their conscience and there was disarray as the General Assembly was 
a novelty, a “political free-for-all.”208 The Cold War, however, provided a firming up of a Soviet 
Bloc, composed of Warsaw Pact members, and a Western bloc, composed of NATO members.209 
Though never one cohesive or formalized group, the regional groups of Latin America, Western 
Europe, the United States, the Commonwealth, Benelux and Scandinavia acted of like minds and 
each voted more than 68% of the time with the majority during the first fifteen years of the 
General Assembly whereas the Soviet Union voted less than 40% of the time with the 
majority.210 Most of these countries shared democracy and capitalism, political systems that 
ideologically separated them from the Soviet bloc. 
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During this polarized period, the Soviet Union was opposed to the admission of Western 
European countries or other countries that were supported by the West. Of the 126 times that the 
USSR invoked its Security Council veto, fifty-one of those were over the applications of new 
members, including six vetoes over Italy’s proposed membership, four each over Ireland, 
Portugal and Japan, three over each Austria and South Korea and two over each Finland and 
South Vietnam.211 
The center  
In the 1950’s a group of relatively small states occupied the center ground in the United 
Nations and forced the larger powers on either extreme to compromise. This group consisted of 
the traditional European neutral states, Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria, and other global 
centrist states including Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Tunisia and Canada. Instead of being party 
to either the West or East, they, along with other moderate states, tended to follow the lead of the 
United Nations Secretariat on many issues.212 
In order to gain sufficient votes for the passage of any resolution, the large voting blocs 
would have to court these centrist states who, averse to getting ensnared in disputes between the 
giants of the organization, weighed the merits of each issue and voted as such. At a Nobel 
Symposium Lecture, Irish Taioseach Sean Lemass, described the mediating states’ role as “the 
conscience of the world” and “the independent arbitrator.”213 These states strove to reduce the 
influence and monopoly of power that the superpowers held and in lieu of direct compromises 
between the two poles, the centrist states would play kingmaker and pass resolutions with a 
softened position.214 
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France represents a special circumstance, as it found itself between many voting blocs. In 
the early history of the United Nations, France was a “neutral or mediating state” between the 
Soviet and United States voting blocs.215 It had always been France’s view that the United 
Nations must leave sovereign states alone in their internal matters; what the world called 
colonies, France considered to be its own départments.216 Under President Charles de Gaulle, the 
France’s popularity had sunk within the United Nations and consequently the United Nation’s 
popularity sunk in France.217 From 1946-1965, France became a pariah of the organization, often 
voting between East and West.218 Only later, as resolutions became sharper disputes between 
colonizers and newly independent countries, mostly over decolonization, France moved into a 
voting bloc with Western Europe states against the South. 
The microstates  are  centr is t s  
The European microstates’ role at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) is indicative of how they would have performed in the early two decades of the United 
Nations. While the character of the General Assembly had changed considerably by the signing 
of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 with the inclusion of post-colonial states (more on this below), 
the CSCE resembled the early years of the United Nations closely in membership and agenda. Of 
the Helsinki Accords’ 35 signatory states, 25 were either original members of the United Nations 
or part of the 1955 package deal. The concerns of the CSCE were those of European security and 
the Cold War, not decolonization which had provoked the North-South cleavage of the General 
Assembly. Rather, the CSCE was a place of dialogue exclusively for East-West matters. The 
CSCE formed in the mid-1970’s in the spirit of Détente, multilateralism and dialogue. Inherent 
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in this attitude, no European states were excluded from the Conference, except for Andorra 
which was not judged to be sufficiently sovereign.219 In the interest of including the microstates 
in principal but not practice, the Conference initially offered the microstates the option to 
participate as observers but, eager for a rare chance to assert their sovereignty on an international 
level, they chose full membership.220 
In negotiations on accords, the microstates were in the Neutral and Non-Aligned group 
(NNA), the corps of states neither party to the Warsaw Pact nor NATO with no specific 
objectives aside from the progress of the CSCE process no matter what tension existed between 
East and West.221 During the 1982 Madrid Follow-up Meeting, all progress was mired in Cold 
War gridlock over confidence and security building measures and disarmament. The NNA was 
essential in breaking this impasse and brought East and West back to the table several times 
avoiding stalemate and serving as honest brokers.222 Appeals for compromise even came directly 
from Prince Franz Joseph II of Liechtenstein who came to Madrid to directly plead for 
progress.223 The leadership and centrism of the microstates was borne out in the CSCE and gives 
us a great idea of where they would have fallen in the General Assembly’s political spectrum. 
The microstates additionally do not wish to find themselves as the focus of any 
international controversy; it is inherent in their foreign policies. With few diplomatic and 
military resources, they would rather avoid any sort of confrontation if at all possible. Much like 
the fictitious Grand Fenwick in the novel The Mouse that Roared, a small state would face 
unmanageable pressure should it go strongly against the world’s status quo or aligned with rogue 
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states. For these reasons and by nature of their foreign policies, the European microstates do not 
take positions on contentious issues. An example of their ambivalence comes in what is annually 
one of the most controversial issues: General Assembly resolutions dealing with the Israel-
Palestine issue. Since 2002, each of the microstates has abstained on the three important 
resolutions perennially brought up on the matter.224 The attitude toward centrality and neutrality 
is deeply ingrained in the microstates’ foreign policies as taking positions on controversial issues 
would go past their primary motivations of joining international organizations for extended 
recognition and increased diplomatic contacts. This desire to recluse themselves from having to 
decide on the most controversial issues shows that they vote down the middle and owe no loyalty 
to either pole. 
Red San Marino 
 Above, I made brief mention of San Marino’s communist regime, in government from 
1945 until 1957. Recall that following the economic devastation of World War II and the 
depreciated Italian lira, San Marino faced financial hardship.225 In 1945, San Marino put into 
power the first ever democratically elected communist government at a national level, though 
this must be understood in its proper context as many small towns and cities of Northern Italy in 
the immediate aftermath of the War had elected communist mayors, this was hardly shocking.226  
I do not believe, however, that if admitted at that point San Marino would have 
necessarily voted reliably in the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union could not ensure that San Marino 
would follow its position on certain issues like it could in its satellite states. Outside of the Iron 
Curtain, San Marino is non-contiguous with the Soviet Union, meaning that Moscow could not 
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use pressure tactics like it did in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania when a bloc member 
strayed out of line. Italy had greater mechanisms for influence than did the USSR.227 Either way, 
it was apparent from 1950 that San Marino’s communist government was on the brink of 
collapse; against great odds it survived seven additional years. Let us not forget the Soviet 
Union’s opposition to San Marino’s application before the International Court of Justice.228 It 
seems that though nominally communist, San Marino was tinged but not entirely red. With the 
deadlock over the admission of members resulting in 1955’s package deal, it is unlikely that 
Moscow would have supported San Marino, uncertain about its future, leaving it in the center. 
The Centrists who Entered 
 If I am to argue that the European microstates were refused membership based solely on 
their political leanings, I must defend that their foreign policies were very similar in character to 
those of Austria, Finland and Ireland. These three countries were admitted in 1955 as part of the 
package deal of sixteen countries that were the result of nearly a decade of negotiations between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. Each country has its own circumstances that enabled 
them to overcome opposition, each requiring tenacity and well-developed diplomatic 
connections to the poles. The later influx of ex-colonial countries shifted this balance of power 
making it unique to the East-West dispute. 
Austr ia  
 Following World War II, Austria was occupied by the former Allies until 1955. An 
essential condition of her admission to the United Nations was her neutrality, signed under a 
protractedly negotiated State Treaty in 1955.229 Austria maintained an observer mission in New 
York beforehand and had applied for full membership as early as 1947 but her application 
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languished while the East and West stalled all membership requests until the 1955 deal. As an 
observer, Austria was able to diplomatically lobby existing United Nations members for support 
for her admission. With the occupying forces on her territory, contact between the new Austrian 
regime and the major powers was very close. Due to its importance in post-war reconstruction 
and its deep diplomatic resources, Austria was not a country that the world community could 
easily ignore. 
Finland  
 Finland found itself in a rather uncomfortable position in World War II, one of few 
countries to have to fight both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Her disputes with Russia go 
back centuries including battle in both World Wars and losing significant territory in the process. 
In 1948, Finland was forced into a common defense contract with the Soviet Union akin to the 
one that Moscow had with Romania and Hungary though Finland was neither a part of NATO 
nor the Warsaw Pact.230 Finnish neutrality was a policy founded after the war and though the 
USSR kept some influence in the country, it respected her new neutral stance; this neutrality was 
also welcome by the West.231 In practice, Finland recused itself from Cold War issues in the 
General Assembly and did not cast votes on the matter.232 Like Austria, Finland applied for 
membership from the late 1940’s only to have its application ignored and has partaken actively 
in peacekeeping operations. 233 
Ire land 
 The Republic of Ireland’s position in the Cold War spectrum between East and West is 
more nuanced than Austria and Finland’s. Her neutrality and fortuitous geographic location kept 
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it out of World War II and it wished to maintain its neutrality post-1945. She was openly anti-
communist and disliked the Soviet Union’s expansion into Eastern Europe.234 At the same time, 
Ireland had its complications with the United Kingdom because of its long ethnic conflict over 
Northern Ireland. Bitter about Ireland’s non-participation in World War II, the United States and 
the United Kingdom consciously excluded Ireland from the San Francisco Conference of 
1945.235 These disputes placed it on an independent trajectory and allowed for either side to see 
it as a potential ally. This foreign policy was erratic and not vehemently pro-western, lending 
itself to what one author terms as “under the radar” misperceptions.236 To the Soviet Union, 
Ireland might realize its enmity of the United Kingdom on the international stage and attempt to 
use the United Nations to perform retribution on its former lord if not on Cold War issues then 
perhaps on decolonization or human rights issues. To the United Kingdom, Ireland might add to 
its Western pro-democracy caucus and build up strength against the Soviet Union. Either way, 
Ireland was eventually accepted with unanimous support as part of the 1955 package deal. Its 
application too had lingered since 1947 and it has also actively participated in peacekeeping 
operations. 
 To compare the center states, they all shared the common trait that they had extensive 
diplomatic ties with the world’s powers. Austria and Finland had established observer missions 
in New York and embassies around the world, increasing their presence. In order to keep their 
applications alive, all three states, had to lobby aggressively so as not to be dropped from the 
package deal at no cost to the poles. Furthermore, Austria and Finland’s neutralities which were 
settled on the terms of the Great Powers guaranteed abstentions on Cold War issues. Therefore, 
these abstentions would not affect the majority total required. Their votes on other issues that 
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might agree with the North like decolonization issues may have been beneficial to the existing 
powers. Ireland’s ambiguity was its greatest boon and its possibility to be not simply a non-
participant but a potential wedge useful for either side helped it overcome the opposition from 
their political positions. 
 The Soviet Union’s vetoes against centrist countries Austria, Finland and Ireland 
illustrate both the Soviet opposition to centrists but moreover the USSR’s unwillingness to admit 
any member until its Warsaw Pact allies were allowed in. The Soviet Union effectively held the 
membership process hostage until it found a favorable solution. Putting partisan difference aside 
and allowing the centrist states would dilute Soviet power, explaining its opposition to a package 
deal that had neither East nor West states. The refusal to bring in the centrists was engendering 
much discontent in the General Assembly which began introducing resolutions expressing 
displeasure at the USSR for not welcoming Austria, Finland and Ireland, among other stalled 
applications. Austria, Finland and Ireland had the diplomatic clout to raise attention to their 
cause and have such resolutions introduced but the smaller centrists, the microstates, did not. 
The particular benefits that these countries offered, allowed them to surmount the barriers 
that arose from their centrism. However the microstates could not offer any sort of comparable 
individual benefits to both poles. While Austria and Finland had tenacious diplomatic outreach, 
due to their limited resources, the microstates could not constantly be in the ear of the Great 
Powers and lobby to the extent like their larger centrist look-alikes could. This brings me to the 
conclusion that the centrist political positions of the microstates was not entirely a prohibition to 
their admission but rather a tall obstacle; one that other states with greater resources could 
overcome but the microstates could not. While the United Nations was able to tolerate a few of 
the undesired centrist states, the pole may have thought of four additional centrists as too much. 
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In prioritizing the few seats that they reluctantly gave to centrists, they heeded the tenacious 
efforts of Austria, Finland and Ireland while ignoring the diplomatically weaker microstates. 
Postco lonial  States 
While the existing United Nations members had the luxury of refusing the European 
microstates, the end of colonization did not allow them to refuse any African, Asian or island 
countries, as to do so would seem backwards and imperialist. Though many colonial powers 
resisted independence movements, sometimes to the extent of war, there was no stopping the 
break off of new countries. The western world for moral and practical considerations had to open 
the door to post-colonial states. Western Europe may have naively believed that its former 
colonies may follow behind them and vote along with the former metropoles. More likely, the 
shame of the crumbling defeat of decolonization put the powers in no position to refuse the 
demands of the states of various sizes that had just proclaimed their freedom. Instead of 
embittering these new countries to Europe and allowing them to take positions with the Soviet 
Union, the West could have thought it wiser to act welcomingly in the hopes of securing future 
cooperation. As a result of colonization, the metropoles shared much with these newly 
independent states by way of economic ties, shared language and certain cultural traits. The hope 
that ex-colonial states would one day join forces with their former colonial rulers made these 
states acceptable by political standards to the Western powers. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, saw opportunity in decolonization, in the hopes of 
both winning new allies and embarrassing their western adversaries. Whereas the European 
microstates had firmly established foreign policies of political neutrality, newly independent 
African, Asian and island states were much more susceptible to influence. Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev believed that, inherently, the newly independent countries would ally themselves 
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with the East as they represented proletariats repressed by western colonizers.237 Furthermore, 
the collapse of the purely capitalistic colonial system was a boost for Communist ideology and a 
comparative gain for the East. The fights for African independence were reminiscent of Marx’s 
long bloody class struggle and the Soviet Union was eager to promote what it viewed as an 
affirmation of political beliefs. The West’s inability to stem the wave of decolonization and the 
East’s help in meeting that end created a prioritization of the African, Asian and island 
microstates over the European microstates and overrode any considerations of disturbing the 
polar balance. 
These misperceptions by West and East alike happened only because of the recent 
emergence of the ex-colonial states. The new states’ foreign policies were fluid and ambiguous. 
The European microstates, on the other hand, had a firmly ingrained foreign policy mentality that 
placed them between the two poles with no ambiguity. The rest of the world knew where the 
historical microstates stood and it did not match the delicate balance of the General Assembly. 
Conclusion 
The costs already high for winning passage or blockage of a resolution, either pole only 
wished to find new partners, not new centrists to be lobbied. The microstates, who would have 
acted as these centrists, would have only been further road blocks in the way of the poles acting 
as they wished. As such, from 1945-1960, the poles discriminated against new members of this 
centrist attitude. Those centrist states which did break through did so only because of their 
tenacity to surmount barriers which the microstates could not, as was the case for Austria and 
Finland, or the ambiguity over which way they would vote, as was the case for Ireland and 
postcolonial states. Little did the poles know that the postcolonial states would vote with neither 
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the East nor the West but rather the South, giving new rise to a regime that solidly discriminated 
against the European microstates. 
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C h a p t e r  F i v e  
1 9 6 0 - 1 9 8 9 :  T h e  D e c o l o n i z a t i o n  D o u b l e  S t a n d a r d  
This final chapter explains for the absence of the European microstates from the United 
Nations during the span of 1960-1989. I first establish the stakes of competition in the General 
Assembly during this era, characterized by developing countries fighting against their former 
colonizers in the north for greater human rights, political power and say on issues like 
Southwestern Africa. Then, I present a conceptual argument of a system that closely matches the 
General Assembly and look at how in a bipolarized system with one pole maintaining a two-
thirds supermajority. This argument addresses the hypothesis: 
HA-B: In a bipolar system where one side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to pass 
resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1960-1989), a new actor who is perceived to 
enter with the minority bloc will face opposition from the powerful bloc resulting in 
barriers to that state gaining membership. 
There may be a group of centrist states in between the poles; however, as I shall explain below, it 
is weak and irrelevant. I then provide context, applying this model to the actual political situation 
of the General Assembly during these years which featured the dominant Non-Aligned 
Movement and the weak minority pole of Northern states. I proceed by explaining how, though 
previously seen as centrists between East and West, we may now easily see the microstates as 
belonging to the Northern bloc. I conclude by discussing the two key events that brought about 
the end of this regime: the end of decolonization which unraveled the cohesion within the NAM 
and the fall of the Berlin Wall which heralded the beginning of the end of the Cold War and with 
it chaos in the geopolitical system. From these explanations, it is clear that while the NAM 
padded its own majority by adding more member-states whose sovereignty, size, capacity and 
willingness were often lesser than those of the European microstates, it discriminated against the 
European microstates that would have voted against it on its most important issues. 
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The Non-Aligned Movement: A Developing Story 
As a result of decolonization, the Non-Aligned Movement emerged in the 1960. A group 
of developing countries, many of whom were former colonial possessions, they did not fit within 
the NATO or Warsaw Pact alliances. Though its origins go back to the 1955 Bandung 
Conference, it truly entered the United Nations in 1960. A key event in its formation was the 
meeting of many heads of state of the future group in 1960 at a special United Nations session in 
New York to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the organization. Here, General Tito of 
Yugoslavia, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Sukarno of Indonesia, Sékou Touré of Guinea and Nkrumah 
of Ghana met face to face and discussed the formation of an organization to give their smaller 
and less developed countries a united global voice.238 The impact of this new coalition was felt 
immediately with the passage of resolution 1514 (XV), the “Declaration on Decolonization” 
which called for a rapid fall of decolonization and the granting of independence to former 
colonies with the support of the Soviet Union.239 Importantly, the resolution established a 
precedent for looser standards for the independence and subsequently membership to the United 
Nations of ex-colonies, declaring “Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”240 This clause’s impact 
is evident in the admissions of the Gambia and the Maldives. 
Chief among the NAM’s politics was the issue of decolonization. In addition to the 
aforementioned Declaration on Decolonization, developing countries pushed other resolutions 
about the issues in Southwest Africa (i.e. Namibia and Apartheid in South Africa), the 
Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, other issues about Non-Self-
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Governing Territories, assertions of self-determination and independence.241 The NAM 
sponsored resolutions dealing with specific conflicts in the developing world, on Algeria, 
Morocco, Cyprus, Angola and Palestine.242 The resolutions on the Israel-Palestine situation were 
especially uncomfortable for Northern states. The NAM also pushed non-political resolutions 
dealing with economic policies, development and economic protection. 
This agenda was especially harsh on former colonial powers, subjecting them to shame. 
The election of U Thant as Secretary General after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld represented 
the early strength of the NAM in the General Assembly. While European states wanted to 
continue the tradition of one of their own rising to the position of Secretary General, developing 
countries protested loudly. Instead, they wanted a new leader to come from a developing 
country, prompting U Thant. Through the coordination of the aforementioned Nkrumah, Tito and 
Sukarno with the aid of other NAM leaders Nehru and Nasser, U Thant became the frontrunner 
for the Secretariat. Thant had long been an advocate of developing countries which can be traced 
back to his participation at the Bandung Conference of African and Asian countries in 1955 as a 
top adviser to Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, which he continued through the next important 
Non-Aligned Conference at Belgrade in 1961.243 He was viewed by many in the West as the 
“embodiment of the Non-Aligned Movement” and described himself as a “fighter against 
colonialism and imperialism.”244 His leadership of the United Nations marked not only the 
arrival of NAM countries on the international stage but really their grasp of control and new 
domination of the geopolitical agenda. 
Conceptual  Argument  
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Recalling the rules that a two-thirds majority is necessary for successful passage of a 
resolution and that each member is entitled to only one vote, let us imagine a situation in which 
one group in the General Assembly commands two-thirds of the votes. There are other actors in 
the system as well. One group is at a pole to the extreme opposite of the commanding pole but 
controls less than one third of votes. There are also centrists, as there were in the previous model, 
however as their votes are not needed in order to secure a two-thirds majority, they have a 
significantly weaker position than in the previous model and cannot act as kingmakers. 
The group with the supermajority as such commands the Assembly as long as it 
maintains cohesion. Accordingly, it controls the membership of the Assembly. It may add new 
members if it perceives that those new members will vote with it on its most important issues. 
Though seemingly, adding new members might be superfluous, it is in fact necessary as the bloc 
as a whole worries about defection from its existing members as internal changes (in the case of 
states, coups or democratic elections that significantly alter that state’s foreign policy outlook) 
can imperil the bloc’s majority. The states in the minority would favor the inclusion of new 
states with which it shared common opinions on the most important issues. However, it had no 
clout whatsoever in the introduction of new members and could not secure their entry. 
Putting the concept into practice : The General Assembly of 1960-1989 
Many Northern states worried about the impact that an influx of African and island states 
would alter the regional voting patterns that had already been established. While Africa and Asia 
(Pacific and Indian island states included) represented a combined 24% of General Assembly 
votes in 1945, their proportions had grown to 39% by 1959 and 56% by 1969.245 This all came at 
the expense of Latin American and European voting power which had inversely slipped over this 
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time period. Projections at that time said that if all non-self governing territories were admitted to 
the United Nations, the balance would be even more heavily non-European.246  It might seem 
natural that the extant European states would push for the inclusion of European microstates as a 
sort of compromise to equal out the voting power of the developing states, however no such 
proposal was ever undertaken. 
Some significant changes that took place in geopolitics altered the topography and hence 
voting patterns in the General Assembly in the 1960’s. First, the organization of the NAM now 
created sufficient force for developing states to have an impact at the General Assembly. The 
increase in membership from 9 African members in 1959 to 26 African members in 1960 rapidly 
increased the Third World’s presence at the United Nations.247 Defections by states which 
formerly supported the United States and Western European countries intensified the growing 
NAM. Cuba, following the 1959 Revolution went from being one of the United States’ most 
ardent supporters to a leader in the developing world.248 Most Latin American countries, with the 
exceptions of conservative outliers Chile and Colombia, abandoned their formerly close alliance 
with the West and drift toward the NAM over the course of the 1960’s and resembled a firm part 
of that bloc by 1975 at the latest.249 The change of legitimate representation of China was both a 
symbol of the strength and the strengthening of the NAM as Northern-leaning Republic of China 
was kicked out of the United Nations in favor of Southern-leaning People’s Republic of China in 
1971. By 1960, the developing world controlled enough influence to block unfavorable 
resolutions, maintaining more than one third of all votes.250 
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The NAM strengthened with the admission of new members. During its reign of 
dominance from 1960 to 1989, of the seventy-six new member-states admitted to the United 
Nations, seventy-one were members of the Movement. The newly independent European 
countries that some consider microstates, Cyprus and Malta, were each part of the NAM. The 
only exceptions were the two Germanys and three Pacific Ocean countries that enjoy close ties to 
the United Kingdom and the United States (Fiji, and Samoa and Solomon Islands, respectively). 
The Non-Aligned Movement’s control over the United Nations system explains the arbitrary 
admittance of small financially incapable African and island states while the European 
microstates were excluded. By 1985, the NAM was so powerful that some called it an 
“automatic majority.”251 The gulf was so large that the top 10% of member-states with which the 
United States had the lowest Coincidence Index shifted from being entirely composed of 
Warsaw Pact members in the early days of the United Nations to being entirely composed of 
Non-Aligned countries from 1981-90.252 
The NAM consolidated its power throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, drastically revising 
the previous East-West bipolar system. The movement served in a way, to help the period of 
Détente as it prioritized the issue of disarmament and thus deescalated the rising tensions 
between the Soviet Union and NATO.253 The top issue priority, however, was decolonization. 
The NAM pushed decolonization and issues with Southern Africa up the agenda. At its peak, the 
topic of decolonization made for 37% of resolutions from 1961 to 1970.254 On these issues, there 
was sharp disagreement between Western Europe and their former colonies.255 
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During the period of Non-Aligned dominance, we can see a vast gap between the North 
and the developing world and the heightening of issues that widened this gap. It is difficult to put 
a precise figure on the amount of states that, in addition to the 80 NAM members, constituted its 
majority, but with the support of Eastern European countries and other developing countries, the 
NAM shared strong coincidence in voting with approximately 143 of the 165 United Nations 
members in the mid-1980’s, at the height of its power.256 
The microstates  as Northern votes 
Considering that the European microstates themselves had no colonial possessions 
overseas, one’s first instinct might be that the microstates would behave as the honest brokers 
that they acted as before in the East-West split. However, we might predict their behavior using 
two other small European countries which shared similarly limited neutral foreign policies, 
Iceland and Luxembourg. On the issue of colonialism, these states, though they were not colonial 
powers and had little stake in protecting the colonial establishment, voted consistently with the 
rest of Western Europe during the 1960’s and 70’s.257 Were the NAM to be watching these states 
looking for clues as to how the European microstates would act on this, its most important issue, 
it certainly would have concluded that they would vote with Europe and against the Movement. 
It is also worth reminding the reader of the strict foreign policy ties that bound Andorra 
and Monaco to France prior to 1993 and 2002 respectively. France was the most vehement 
opponent of decolonization and the rights of ex-colonial states. Furthermore, many of the newly 
independent states were colonies of France and held her in an unfavorable view. It would be 
against these states’ interests to reward France with multiple extra votes. 
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The NAM was not open to the admission of the European microstates on the grounds that 
it would weaken its supermajority. Their admission would grow the voting bloc of the General 
Assembly to which the NAM was in opposition, allowing it to get closer to the one-third 
threshold necessary for the blockage of NAM-supported resolutions. The delicate balance of the 
system and the Non-Aligned Movement’s slight majority explain for the exclusion of the 
European microstates up until the late 1980’s. While a small state that was politically opposed to 
the NAM was unacceptable for membership, a small state with which was aligned was perfectly 
acceptable. It is most interesting, however, that this opposition was publicly justified using 
standards to which many NAM members themselves would fail to satisfy, those of sovereignty 
and capacity/ This double standard explains the inclusion of post-colonial states whose 
membership violated the norms of sovereignty, size and capacity. 
The end o f  the reg ime 
With decolonization nearing its end, Namibia achieving independence and the fall of 
Apartheid on its way in the late 1980’s, the Non-Aligned Movement had outlived its raison 
d’être. Already, its cohesion had been slipping, as expressed by Confidence Index, during the 
end of the 1980’s. The United States had aggressively tried to break up the coalition by applying 
bilateral pressure to individual members of the NAM.258 Perhaps sensing this weakness was the 
impetus behind San Marino establishing its observer mission in 1987 and Liechtenstein’s 
diplomatic efforts of the end of the 1980’s. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 sparked chaos in 
the bipolar international system. The collapse of the socialist bloc causes the NAM to lose 
strength.259 
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The sudden and radical shift in world politics at the end of the 1980’s provided the 
European microstates with an opportunity to join the United Nations at a brief and rare period 
where their candidatures were unobjectionable. The combination of the unraveling of the Non-
Aligned Movement and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe created chaos in the 
world political system and an attitude of inclusion that created an opening for the microstates. 
While previously the combined opposition of East-West poles and centrist voters from 1945-
1960 and the NAM’s unilaterally opposition to the European microstates from 1960-1989 
created obstacles too high for the microstates to overcome, in the New World Order there was no 
organized opposition. Instead of realignment, as occurred in the shift from East-West to North-
South, the trend was toward dealignment as one author puts it.260 States scrambled to find new 
partners, creating a desire for wider membership including the European microstates. While 
some believe that the admission of the microstates was a sort of quid pro quo to balance the 
multitude of new countries emerging from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,261 this seems like a 
specious argument as there was no guarantee as to how the Eastern European and Central Asian 
countries would vote (some to this day are pro-Western while others are pro-Russia) and with the 
successful cooperation between the United States and Russia in the Gulf War, there was no 
perception that the two former adversaries would be polar opposites again. 
The European microstates no longer threatened to change a delicate political balance as 
there was no such balance at the beginning of the 1990’s. The microstates’ power to weaken a 
dominant group’s hold of the United Nations no longer existed and their admissions were now 
welcome. 
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 With fewer blocs, this is a much simpler model to understand. It plays to a more 
straightforward logic that a supermajority in control of membership will never want to allow in 
new members that may threaten this majority and its power to bring forward and pass resolutions 
on its agenda. This second era was perhaps the cruelest to the European microstates. While other 
states of similarly small size were welcome because they were politically aligned with the 
dominant Non-Aligned Movement, the European microstates languished outside of the United 
Nations. The exceptions where Northern states entered were few: the two Germanys, whose 
entry was the result of a long face-off resolved by the success of Östpolitik, and Samoa, Fiji and 
Solomon Islands, each of whom were former colonies, most likely provoking confusion as to 
where their loyalties would eventually lie after United Nations membership. 
The debate of the 1960s’ effect on the European microstates had both positive and 
negative effects on the European microstates. It was good in that it renewed interest in the 
microstates, produced much scholarly work and had people asking aloud why these states were 
being excluded. At the same time it had its tradeoffs in that it mischaracterized the states and 
could not produce any breakthrough for membership. While Northern states were quick to make 
general statements about the incapacities of microstates as a way of discrediting the ex-colonial 
states and dissuading them from joining the United Nations, they only had the effect of 
stigmatizing the European microstates as the newly independent ones marched in. All in all, 
nothing could defeat the double standard of the NAM except for its own demise. That, combined 
with the end of the Cold War lowered barriers so significantly that the European microstates 




C o n c l u s i o n  
As it is now clear, the European microstates are more than simple entities and the United 
Nations’ reasons for not including them in its decision-making process were equally complex. 
While their most obvious characteristics are their small sizes, unique political systems and 
dependence upon their neighbors, these were not truly the reasons for their exclusion from the 
United Nations. Previous attempts to affix these reasons as the microstates’ shortcomings are 
misguided and do not account for exceptions that reflect preferential treatment for other 
countries. Rather, their geopolitical positions within the context of the General Assembly made 
them unacceptable. The centrist votes that they would have cast would have made achieving a 
two-thirds majority or a one-third blocking minority more expensive from 1945-1960. The 
Northern-leaning votes they would have cast from 1960-1989 would have diluted the South’s 
two-thirds majority, causing the South to make the European microstates unwelcome while at the 
same time making like-minded small and incapable ex-colonial states quite welcome. 
I have argued effectively for the support of my hypotheses: 
HA-A: In a bipolar system where neither side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to 
pass resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1945-1960), a new actor who is perceived 
to enter at the center will face opposition from the existing actors resulting in barriers to 
that state gaining membership. 
and 
HA-B: In a bipolar system where one side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to pass 
resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1960-1989), a new actor who is perceived to 
enter with the minority bloc will face opposition from the powerful bloc resulting in 
barriers to that state gaining membership. 
However, I understand that my qualitative assessment would benefit from the help of qualitative 
analysis. While HA-B is much more straightforward and makes sense instinctively, HA-A is more 
complex. I remain confident in my analyses of the hypotheses but readily welcome a challenge 
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with quantitative methods and spatial analysis in the hopes of improving my argument. Even if 
my argument does not hold up to further inspection, the lessons of my thesis are still mostly 
intact as I show that beyond the conceptual argument, the microstates’ political positions led to 
barriers being put in place of their inclusion. 
Other countries were able to overcome these barriers during the first era due to their 
persistency and diplomatic skills afforded by a longer diplomatic history and greater resources. 
The European microstates, however, could not surmount these obstacles. This might seem like 
circular logic to some as their inability to join the United Nations ultimately can be attributed to 
their limited capacity to lobby for admission. However, we must differentiate between the 
motivation and the consequence of the barriers being put into place to understand the powerful 
blocs’ discrimination. The microstates’ sovereignty, size, capacity and perceived lack of 
willingness would be irrelevant were it not for the barriers placed purely for political reasons. 
States that were limited in sovereignty, size and capacity all had in common that they were 
politically allied or perceived to be allied with a powerful bloc already in the General Assembly. 
While these countries did not have to struggle at all to get in, Austria and Finland did. 
Furthermore, we must distinguish between the capacity to uphold Charter obligations and the 
capacity to lobby for entry. The first is a legitimate requirement for admission as indicated in 
Article 4, Section 1, the second is not. The European microstates had the first capacity, not the 
second. 
The fact that the microstates had a limited capacity to lobby does not weaken but rather 
strengthens my thesis. Were the standards of membership to have been constantly applied to all 
applicants, the microstates would have been members much earlier than the Soviet and ex-
colonial states of questionable qualifications. Yet as they were instead subjected to unfavorable 
 
SNYDER | 103
political calculations, the microstates faced barriers. Had many of the states who were admitted 
to the United Nations prior been subjected to the same barriers, they certainly would not have 
gained entry. The Gambia and the Maldives, for example, would not have been able to lobby for 
several years as Austria, Finland and Ireland did because they could not even afford to send a 
delegation to New York in many of their early years as a member. Let us not forget that at the 
end of the 1980’s, the microstates’ sovereignties,262 size, capacities or willingness did not 
change, but rather the political structure of the United Nations did. In sum, the United Nations’ 
opposition was formed due to the microstates’ political positions and had these stances been 
different, they would not have been excluded. 
These barriers to centrist states should never have been there in the first place. Their 
presence, uncalled for by the Charter, created additional requirements, against the International 
Court of Justice’s 1949 ruling. Sovereignty, size and capacity were not the dependent variables 
in determining how high the barriers were, rather it was a state’s perceived foreign policy 
position in the General Assembly that set the height. The microstates had sufficient capacity and 
could not change their size and could only make incremental changes in their sovereignties. 
Therefore, the choice before the microstates was to either change foreign policies and ally with 
one of the poles or wait for a more fortuitous time. The European microstates chose the latter. 
Others may argue that it was not correct of me to singularize each hypothesis and ignore 
that a combination of limited sovereignty, small size, limited capacity and perceived 
unwillingness explain the microstates’ absence. However I would contend that we cannot 
overlook the political favoritism played in the admissions of Ukraine, Belarus and many ex-
colonial countries in advance of their sovereignty or capacity in order to stack votes for one bloc. 
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States were willing to break the Charter requirements of membership for states with which they 
were allied. The only difference between those states and the microstates is the microstates’ 
political positions. 
The question also lingers as to Switzerland’s status with regards to the United Nations.  
Following its rebuff from the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945, popular opinion turned 
sharply against applying for membership. The Swiss government’s policy evolved and it desired 
membership to the United Nations in 1981 and argued that its neutrality was no longer an 
impediment to admission.263 This attempt was stalled by a failed referendum where Swiss voters 
rejected admission. There is no doubt that Switzerland would have faced the same opposition for 
being a centrist that the European microstates did, however this would have been rapidly 
overcome. Switzerland’s extensive diplomatic networks and her proven utility as an interlocutor 
in the past have earned her a leading role in international affairs. Like Austria and Finland, 
Switzerland would be very difficult to ignore if it asked earlier for admission as its diplomatic 
resources are much vaster than those of the microstates. Eventually, Switzerland joined in 2002 
with no opposition. 
Impl i cat ions 
The United Nations discriminated against the microstates, yet to the microstates 
themselves, membership in this seemingly cruel organization remained a cherished goal. The 
microstates would have reason to abhor the United Nations as a result, but instead they remain 
ardent supporters, glad to finally have their place on the world stage. This is because the fruits of 
membership never changed. Despite the arbitrary manner in which the United Nations conferred 
legitimacy upon new members by recognizing and welcoming them, membership never lessened 
in value and continued to mark the arrival of a state to official world politics. 
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 For the European microstates, after being the potentially diluting centrists in the Cold 
War-characterized General Assembly of 1945-1960 and the straws that would have broken the 
camels’ back in the NAM-dominated General Assembly of 1960-1989, they were no longer 
feared as tipping points that could change the power dynamic in the early 1990’s, allowing for 
their admissions. Each of these arguments is supported by a conceptual approach so that it is not 
merely explaining what happened but analyzing the interests of any generic system with the 
same power balance that the General Assembly had during these time periods. 
This thesis makes a good start-point for those who are skilled at spatial modeling to 
analyze the admissions practices of other international organizations. With the aid of a 
quantitative analysis that can be subjected to a proof, we might be able to draw more concrete 
conclusions as to the political position of a state and the political resistance that it provokes when 
trying to gain membership. We might also factor in the state’s economic and diplomatic strength 
and how those might influence the state’s ability to overcome these barriers. Such an analysis 
could add a new dimension to such well-research subjects that are understood more in a 
qualitative fashion like Turkey and the European Union and the Republic of China or Palestine 
and the United Nations. 
Though not excluded for political reasons, but most likely for financial reasons, the South 
Pacific island Republic of Nauru gained its admission to the United Nations as well in the 
1990’s. Itself a former German and Japanese colony, it followed the trusteeship system to gain 
its independence in 1968 and later United Nations membership in 1995. Considering its close 
links with Australia, which continue to this day, one might assume that despite its foreign policy 
would be pro-western and support Australia and one of its strongest allies, the United States. The 
world was shocked when in December 2009, Nauru took the controversial step of recognizing 
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South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, in defiance of the west, allegedly in return for 
financial support from Russia.264 This demonstrates one advantage for large states of excluding 
small states. When left out of international organizations, they lack a degree of legitimacy and 
can be much more easily contained. Nauru, once unleashed on the world stage, was free to do as 
it wished. 
The admission of the European microstates to the United Nations marked their arrival on 
the world stage and finally gave them the legitimacy that they had been seeking for nearly a 
century. By not being anybody’s enemy, they had become everybody’s enemy. The power of 
sovereign equality gave them the chance to settle disputes and go from principalities to 
kingmakers. As the rest of the world wished not to move the deciding votes on resolutions 
outside of their coalitions, they continued to refuse the microstates membership. 
While the myth of the elephant’s fear of mice may only be just that, a myth, we now see 
that the giants of international politics long avoided the smallest creatures in its domain. 
However, it was not their size that threatened the Great Powers but rather their equal weight 
which was so problematic that the United Nations refused to welcome them. Fearing which way 
a mouse would tip the scale between two elephants, the elephants chose that they would rather 
have the scale retain its balance. 
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